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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to the issue of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration, the
concept of attaining justice for all partie n a vacuum instead of in com-
parison to the fall back—the litigation and agency adjudication
processes. In this Article, we address each of the components of arbitra-
tion, but in context to the alternative and thus, conclude that a fixed arbi-
tration system will provide the type of justice unavailable in the current
system.
The issue of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration of discrimination,
and other employment, cases has been a topic of discussion for over
twenty-five years. Initially, the question was simply one of legality—
could employers actually require employees, as a condition of employ-
ment, to agree to arbitrate all their claims? Of course, this question was
simple if the answer was no. Yes, however, was more complicated. What
did the agreements need to contain to be enforceable? Did they apply in
the union setting? Could they include class action waivers? As explained
more fully below, most of the legal issues have been resolved and the
remaining one—the enforceability of class action waivers—has created a
split in the circuits that hopefully will be resolved in the near future. Now
that the law is mostly settled, the question that remains is easy to state
and difficult to answer—should pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agree-
ments be enforceable? The answer, we contend, is yes. In fact, we take
the argument a step further and argue that not only should the administra-
tive agencies stop contesting arbitration, they should enact policies of
deferral.
This Article contends that in order to provide a path to justice, the
administrative agencies that enforce employment laws should no longer
contest cases, but instead should defer them to arbitration. In Part I, we
give an overview of the law. In Part II, we identify the problems with the
current system for adjudicating employment disputes by examining the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and litigation pro-
cess. In Part III, we provide a theoretical argument as to why the EEOC/
litigation process is flawed and should be replaced. In Part IV, we iden-
tify, contest, and address the arguments against pre-dispute arbitration.
Finally, in Part V, we propose a new system to provide access to justice
for employees seeking redress under the law.
I. THE LAW OF ARBITRATION
A full discussion of the law of arbitration is beyond the scope of this
article and can be found in numerous other law review articles.1 That
1 See generally David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath
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said, it is important to provide a baseline for understanding if pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration is lawful, with or without class action waivers.
A. An Overview of the Law
The evolution of the law is complex and somewhat convoluted. In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, a 1973 case, a union member employee
was fired and arbitrated his grievance under his union contract.2 At the
arbitration, the employee alleged the employer terminated the employee
because of his race.3 The arbitrator denied the grievance and held there
was cause for termination.4 Subsequently, the employee filed a race dis-
crimination case in federal court, where the employer argued that (1) the
arbitration was the exclusive forum for the dispute, and regardless of
that, (2) the employee had chosen to go to arbitration and was not enti-
tled to the proverbial second bite of the apple.5 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the employer’s argument and found that
the arbitration did not preclude the employee from a subsequent lawsuit.6
The basis for the Court’s decision was twofold. First, the Court held that
while arbitration was fine for contract rights (the just cause provision in
the union contract), it was not appropriate for statutory rights (in this
case, anti-discrimination law).7 Second, the Court held that union arbitra-
tion provisions were inappropriate for resolving discrimination lawsuits
because the union, not the employee, “owned” the grievance, and be-
cause the union, by definition, was supposed to focus on the good of the
whole, the individual case could get lost.8 Most lawyers and scholars
took the holding of Gardner-Denver to mean that pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration policies did not prevent employees from pursuing a statutory
claim in court. This consensus lasted until Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Corp. in 1991.9
In Gilmer, the employee had to sign an arbitration agreement as a
condition to accepting a position that involved working on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE).10 The NYSE agreement provided that all dis-
putes arising out of employment would be adjudicated before an arbitra-
tor and thus precluded the employees from filing cases in court.11 After
Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 133 (1999)
[hereinafter Sherwyn et al., Saving the Baby].
2 415 U.S. 36, 38–39 (1974).
3 Id. at 42.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 43.
6 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974).
7 Id. at 53–54.
8 Id. at 52, 58 n.19.
9 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
10 Id. at 23.
11 Id.
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two years of employment, the company fired Gilmer, who then filed an
age discrimination case in federal court.12 The employer filed a motion to
compel arbitration and the issue was once again ripe, but this time the
result was different.13
The Gilmer Court enforced the motion to compel and distinguished
Gilmer from the employee in Gardner-Denver because Gilmer’s contract
was an individual contract and not a union contract.14 The fact that Gil-
mer’s case involved a statutory right did not affect the decision because
there was Supreme Court precedent to enforce arbitration of statutory
rights as long as the statute did not expressly prohibit arbitration.15 It
must be noted that Gilmer does not prevent an employee from filing a
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or any other
administrative agency and it cannot prevent that agency from filing a
claim on behalf of the employee.16
Gilmer made two more arguments that the Court rejected. First, Gil-
mer argued that the arbitration was unfair because in some cases (1) there
are no written opinions, (2) the employee does not get to choose the
arbitrator, (3) damages are less than that provided in court, (4) discovery
is limited, and (5) the employee’s decision to sign the contract is not
knowing and voluntary.17 Second, he argued that his employment con-
tract was not covered by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and, thus,
there was no basis for enforcing the contract.18 The Court rejected the
first three fairness issues, not because these “defects” would make a pol-
icy unfair and therefore unenforceable, but because the NYSE policies
provided for written opinions, choice of arbitrator, and damages equal to
those in court.19 The Court rejected the discovery issue because the point
of arbitration is that it should be quicker and less expensive than litiga-
tion, so limited discovery was not only acceptable, it was part of the
process.20 With regard to the “knowing and voluntary” contention, the
Court held that a take it or leave it policy is effectively voluntary.21 The
unequal bargaining power in this situation does not make signing the
12 Id. at 23–24.
13 Id. at 24.
14 Id. at 33–34. After Gilmer it seemed that arbitrations in union contracts could not
prevent litigation. This later changed in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 247–48
(2009).
15 500 U.S. 20, 34–35 (1991).
16 Id. at 31–33.
17 Id. at 30–31.
18 Id. at 26–27.
19 Id. at 30–31.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 32–33.
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contract involuntary, since the employee could walk away from the em-
ployment offer.22
The second argument concerned the FAA.23 The FAA instructs
courts to enforce arbitration agreements, but excludes employment con-
tracts for “seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”24 Gilmer argued that the
term “commerce” in the FAA should be interpreted broadly and thus
exclude all employment contracts.25 As one would expect, the employer
argued for a narrow interpretation of the term commerce and contended
that exclusion of employment contracts was limited to employees in the
transportation industry.26 The Gilmer Court held that it did not have to
rule on the definition of commerce because a contract between an em-
ployee of Interstate/Johnson and the NYSE was not an employment con-
tract since the NYSE was not the employer.27 Since the contract was not
an employment contract, it was not excluded from coverage under the
FAA.28 Because very few industries have a governing body that requires
employees to sign contracts in order to work, the Gilmer Court’s FAA
holding was extremely limited. Thus, after Gilmer there were two main
issues: what constitutes a fair agreement and the effect of the FAA.
In the next twenty years, the courts defined both what is fair and the
effect of the FAA. The effect of the FAA is easily described. In Circuit
City v. Adams,29 the Supreme Court held that congressional intent behind
the phrase “seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” was limited to the transporta-
tion industry and that commerce did not have the widespread meaning
that is ascribed to it today.30 Thus, any employer outside the transporta-
tion industry can implement an arbitration policy as long as it is fair.
With regard to fairness, most jurisdictions simply examine the sub-
stance of the policy and determine what is fair. The threshold rules from
Gilmer (i.e., written opinions, statutory damages, choice of arbitrator,
some discovery, and knowing and voluntary), the so-called “due process
protocol,”31 and the standards set forth in Armendariz v. Foundation
22 Id.
23 Id. at 33.
24 Id. at 24–25, 25 n.2.
25 Id. at 25 n.2.
26 Id. at 23.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 25 n.2.
29 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
30 Id. at 119.
31 The American Arbitration Association’s Due Process Protocol covers, among other
things, the right of representation, the fees for representation, access to information, selection
of arbitrators, and qualifications of arbitrators. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT
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Health Psychcare Services, Inc.32 created a template for determining
fairness. Of course, different jurisdictions have slightly different stan-
dards. For example, some jurisdictions require mutuality, while others
hold that the costs to the employee must not exceed those which would
be charged by a court.33
In California, contracts are unenforceable if they are procedurally
and substantively unconscionable. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
(Adams III),34 the Ninth Circuit, applying California law, held that “take
or leave it” clauses are procedurally unconscionable.35 Next, the court,
still applying California law, held that the policy was substantively un-
conscionable because it limited damages and did not require mutuality.36
In other words, employees were required to arbitrate, but employers
could litigate.37 The court then refused to enforce Circuit City’s policy
because it failed both tests.38 In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed,39
however, the Ninth Circuit held that an “opt-out” option (i.e., the em-
ployee was covered by the arbitration policy, but had thirty days to “opt-
out”) was not procedurally unconscionable and then enforced the same
policy that it earlier had found substantively unconscionable.40 Thus, in
California employers can have substantively unconscionable policies as
long as there is an opt-out for employees.
In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,41 the issue before the Court was
whether an arbitration agreement in a union contract prohibited an em-
ployee from filing an age discrimination case in federal court—a pro-
position that seemingly conflicted with Gardner-Denver.42 In upholding
the arbitration agreement, the Court effectively, but not expressly, over-
turned Gardner-Denver by holding that arbitration clauses in collective
bargaining agreements can prohibit litigation as long as the clause clearly
and expressly states that the arbitration agreement prohibits the employ-
DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1995), https://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GET_
FILE&dDocName=ADRSTAGE2025665&RevisionSelectionMethod=latestReleased.
32 6 P.3d 669 (2000).
33 Id. at 692. But see Kepas v. eBay, 412 Fed. App’x 40, 47 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the employer solved the mutuality problem by exempting all issues relating to company’s
Employee Propriety Information and Inventions Agreement). Thus, employers could use the
courts to pursue injunctions over trade secrets and employees could use the courts to protect
their own inventions. The court noted this was a narrow exemption because the nature of the
work led to inventions by employees. Id.
34 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002).
35 Id. at 893.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 896.
39 283 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002).
40 Id. at 1198.
41 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
42 Id. at 251.
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ees from pursuing their cases in court.43 Thus, for the last seven years,
employers with experienced employment counsel have been able to draft
policies that will ensure that their employment lawsuits will be resolved
in arbitration, not litigation. In fact, prior to the spring of 2016, we could
have stated that not only will arbitration agreements be enforceable, they
also can preclude class action waivers. This conclusion is no longer valid
because there is now a split in the circuits.
Below we address whether class action waivers should be enforcea-
ble or not. Prior to the spring of 2016 there was no question that such
waivers were enforceable. Now, however, the enforceability of the class
action waivers is an open question.
B. Class Action Waivers
In two cases, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.44 and Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,45 the Supreme Court held
that arbitration does not deny a party a statutory right and that the use of
class actions is a procedural, not a substantive right. Thus, absent legisla-
tion expressly prohibiting arbitration or class action waivers, the Court’s
precedent is clear: pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements with
class action waivers are enforceable.
In In re D.R. Horton, however, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
does, in fact, prohibit class action waivers.46 On appeal, however, the
Fifth Circuit refused to enforce that part of the Board’s decision.47 Simi-
larly, the Eighth Circuit in Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC v. National
Labor Relations Board expressly rejected the Board’s position.48 The
Fifth and Eighth Circuits are in agreement with the Second Circuit in
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, LLP,49 and seemingly with the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, where the court rejected the
NLRB’s D.R Horton decision, but the rejection was not part of the hold-
ing, because the plaintiff did not bring up the NLRA argument until the
appeal.50 In Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., however, the Seventh Circuit
43 Id. at 248.
44 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985).
45 521 U.S. 591, 612–13 (1997).
46 See 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012) (noting that D.R. Horton does not hold that pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration agreements violate the NLRA, just that the class action waiver does).
47 See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).
48 824 F.3d 772, 772 (8th Cir. 2016).
49 See 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013).
50 734 F.3d 871, 873–74 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Alternatively, Ms. Richards urges that we may
rely on the decision of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) decision in D.R. Horton
to affirm the district court’s judgment. We decline to do so. Ms. Richards failed to raise the
argument that her arbitration agreement with Ernst & Young was unenforceable under the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) until after the parties had briefed, and the district
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adopted the Board’s D.R. Horton ruling.51 Two months later, the Ninth
Circuit, in Morris v. Ernst & Young, followed the reasoning of the Epic
case and denied enforcement of the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss.52 Thus,
there is a split in the circuits.
There are several issues that factor into the respective class action
waiver decisions, but as far as we are concerned, the question comes
court had denied, Ernst & Young’s motion to compel. ‘We apply a “general rule” against
entertaining arguments on appeal that were not presented or developed before the district
court.’ We also note that the only court of appeals, and the overwhelming majority of the
district courts, to have considered the issue have determined that they should not defer to the
NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton because it conflicts with the explicit pronouncements of the
Supreme Court concerning the policies undergirding the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”) . . . .”) (citing Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1321 (9th Cir.
1998)). Id. at 874 n.3 (“See, e.g., Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir.
2013) (‘[G]iven the absence of any “contrary congressional command” from the FLSA that a
right to engage in class actions overrides the mandate of the FAA in favor of arbitration, we
reject Owen’s invitation to follow the NLRB’s rationale in D.R. Horton . . . .’ (quoting Com-
puCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012)); Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs.
USA, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 784, 789 (E.D. Ark. 2012) (‘The Court declines to endorse, how-
ever, the Board’s application of the Federal Arbitration Act or its reading of the precedent
applying that Act. The NLRA, as interpreted in Horton, conflicts with the FAA, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court.’) . . . .”); id. at 874 (“Finally, the Supreme Court recently has reiterated
that ‘courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms’ and that
this ‘holds true for claims that allege a violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA’s mandate
has been overridden by a contrary congressional command.’”). Id. at 874 n. 3 (“. . . . Morvant
v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831, 845 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (‘concluding
that “Congress did not expressly provide that it was overriding any provision in the FAA when
it enacted the NLRA or the Norris-LaGuardia Act”‘) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jasso
v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (‘Because Con-
gress did not expressly provide that it was overriding any provision in the FAA, the Court
cannot read such a provision into the NLRA and is constrained by [AT&T Mobility LLC v.]
Concepcion [, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011),] to enforce the instant agreement according to its
terms.’); LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2308 (BSJ) (JLC), 2012 WL 124590,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012) (holding that ‘this Court must read AT&T Mobility as standing
against any argument that an absolute right to collective action is consistent with the FAA’s
“overarching purpose” of “ensur[ing] the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to
their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings” and that, “[t]o the extent that LaVoice
relies on . . . the recent decision of the [NLRB] in D.R. Horton, Inc. . . . , as authority to
support a conflicting reading of AT&T Mobility, this Court declines to follow th[at] deci-
sion[ ]”‘ (quoting AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1748)). But see Brown v. Citicorp Credit
Servs., No. 1:12-cv-00062-BLW, 2013 WL 645942, at *3 (D. Idaho Feb. 21, 2013) (deferring
to NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), as ‘rational and consistent’ with the NLRA, but failing to consider
countervailing policies or deference with respect to the FAA); Herrington v. Waterstone
Mortg. Corp., No. 11-cv-779-bbc, 2012 WL 1242318, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012) (find-
ing ‘the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA in D.R. Horton[ ] is reasonably defensible’ and,
therefore, ‘applying it . . . to invalidate the collective action waiver in the arbitration agree-
ment’ (internal quotation marks omitted))”). Id. at 874 (“Congress,’ however, ‘did not ex-
pressly provide that it was overriding any provision in the FAA when it enacted the NLRA or
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.’” (quoting Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F.
Supp. 2d 831, 845 (N.D. Cal. 2012))).
51 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).
52 834 F.3d. 975 (9th Cir. 2016).
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down to whether filing a class action lawsuit is a substantive right pro-
tected by the NLRA. To answer this question, we need to examine the
NLRA,53 the FAA,54 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23),55
which allows for class actions.
The NLRA provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-
organize, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.”56 The question is whether the term
“other mutual aid or protection” creates a substantive right to file class
actions. The FAA provides that any written contract “evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereaf-
ter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of such contract.”57 Rule 23 describes the pro-
cess by which plaintiffs can be certified as a class when pursuing their
legal claims. Thus, to hold that the NLRA prohibits class action waivers,
one must conclude that the procedural right of Rule 23 is actually a sub-
stantive right under the NLRA and does not undermine the FAA.
First, we will examine the NLRA and Rule 23. There is no dispute
that the use of Rule 23’s class action procedures is a procedural, not a
substantive, right.58 In Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper,59 the
Supreme Court stated that the right of a litigant to employ the class ac-
tion procedures of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, or the collective
action procedures under the FLSA,60 “is a procedural right only, ancil-
lary to the litigation of substantive claims.”61 Both the NLRB in D.R.
Horton, and the Seventh Circuit in Epic, accept that Rule 23 is a proce-
dural right, but contend that its use is a substantive right under the
NLRA.
The Board, the Seventh Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit make similar
arguments in holding that filing a class action is a substantive right under
the NLRA. The Seventh Circuit stated that the “right to collective action
in [S]ection 7 of the NLRA is not, however, merely a procedural one. It
instead lies at the heart of the restructuring of the employer/employee
53 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
54 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012).
55 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
56 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
57 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
58 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612–13 (1997); see also Deposit
Guar. Nat’l Bank. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980).
59 Roper, 445 U.S. at 332.
60 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
61 In re D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2278, 2286 (2012) (citing Roper, 445 U.S. at
332).
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relationships that Congress meant to achieve in the statute.”62 Similarly,
the Board in D.R. Horton stated that “Rule 23 may be a procedural rule,
but the Section 7 right to act concertedly by invoking Rule 23, Section
216(b), or other legal procedures is not.”63
There are a number of ways to attempt to get to the heart of this
matter. First is the fact that the NLRA predates both Rule 23 and the
FLSA. Can the NLRA create a substantive right from something that did
not exist at the time of its passing? It seems the answer is a clear yes. If
not, any type of electronic communication would fall outside the purview
of the NLRA because it did not exist at the time. We could come up with
numerous other examples that would make the chronological argument
seem silly. Second, we should look to the NLRA and try to determine if
class action should be considered a substantive right that is so absolute
that it cannot be waived. As stated above, the Epic court stated that col-
lective action is the heart of what Congress was attempting to achieve in
the Act.64 It is obviously clear, however, that filing an FLSA class action
does not facilitate forming, joining, or assisting labor organizations for
the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives. Thus, to be
covered by the Act, the class action must fit into the catchall: “other
mutual aid or protection.” Thus, the question is whether filing a class
action is what Congress meant when it used this term and whether the
term is absolute or should be part of a balancing act.
Of course, direct and actual congressional intent is impossible to
reveal when neither the FLSA nor Rule 23 existed at the time of the
passage of the NLRA. Furthermore, there is no direct evidence to support
the contention that a congressional purpose of the Act was to allow em-
ployees greater access to litigation over issues that have nothing to do
with collective bargaining. Thus, to support the holding in Epic, one
would have to infer that Congress intended to protect all concerted activ-
ity, even if does not lead to collective bargaining and that the employee’s
rights trump all others. This is not the case. The NLRB has been “balanc-
ing the rights of employees and employers since its inception. The most
famous and common balancing tests revolve around the employees’
rights to organize on employer property and the employer’s property
rights.”65
On October 1, 2014, the Daily Labor Reports produced an analysis
of the evolution of the balancing test between employees’ Section 7
rights to organize and the employer’s right to protect its property. Below
62 Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1160 (7th Cir. 2016).
63 D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2286.
64 See Epic, 823 F.3d at 1160.
65 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
U.S. 105 (1956).
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we provide this analysis to demonstrate how the courts have been balanc-
ing rights since at least 1945.
In Republic Aviation Corp., v NLRB, the Supreme Court weighed
the employer’s management rights and the need to maintain order and
discipline in the workplace against the employees’ rights under the Act.66
The Court held that when an employee is not on work time, his time is
his own, and he can engage in union solicitation activity, even if he is on
the employer’s property.67 This balancing test was once again employed
in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.68 In that case, nonemployee union
organizers were distributing union literature in employer-owned parking
lots.69 The Court overturned the Board, finding that the refusal of the
employers to permit distribution of union literature by non-employee
union organizers on company-owned parking lots did not unreasonably
impede their employees’ right to self-organization.70 The Court reasoned
that the locations of both the working and living areas of the employees
did not place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable efforts of the
unions to communicate with them by other means.71 The Court reiterated
that “[t]he Act requires only that the employer refrain from interference,
discrimination, restraint or coercion in the employees’ exercise of their
own rights. It does not require that the employer permit the use of its
facilities for organization when other means are readily available.”72 In
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the Court stated it was improper even to begin a
balancing test with regard to Section 7 and private property rights unless
“reasonable access to employees is infeasible.”73
The Board later addressed off-duty employees’ rights to organize.
In Tri-County Medical Center, 222 N.L.R.B. 1089,
91 LRRM 1323 (1976), the NLRB developed a three-
part test to determine the validity of an employer’s off-
duty access policy. The [B]oard found such policies to
be lawful only if the policy: (1) limits access solely to
the interior of the facility and other working areas; (2) is
clearly disseminated to all employees; and (3) applies to
off duty employees seeking access to the facility for any
purpose and not just to those engaging in union activity.
The first prong of the test recognizes the em-
ployer’s interest in controlling employee activity in
66 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
67 Id. at 803–05.
68 351 U.S. 105, 106 (1956).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 112–14.
71 Id. at 113–14.
72 Id.
73 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992).
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working areas because of its potential effects on produc-
tion. The second prong balances the strength of the em-
ployer’s legitimate interest. The board believes that
unless the employer clearly tells its employees about the
policy, the employer’s interests will likely not outweigh
the employee’s. Finally, the third prong looks to the neu-
trality of the policy, as applied for any purpose.74
If organizing a union is not an absolute right, then clearly filing a class
action is not an absolute right and therefore it makes sense to balance the
employees’ rights, the employers’ rights, and in this case, the FAA.
As stated above, the FAA evidences federal policy to encourage
arbitration as a method to resolve disputes. The court in D.R. Horton
relied on the earlier decision AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion to hold
that barring class action waivers violates the FAA.75 In Concepcion, the
Court analyzed the legality of a California statute prohibiting class action
waivers.76 In finding that the statute violated the FAA, the Court held
that eliminating class action waivers seriously undermined the com-
pany’s arbitration policy and thus violated the FAA.77 The Court found
that class-wide arbitrations sacrificed informality, the principle advan-
tage of arbitration, and made “the process slower, more costly, and more
likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”78 The Court
then held that class wide arbitration “interferes with the fundamental at-
tributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA.”79
The Board in D.R. Horton and the Epic court contend that eliminat-
ing the legality of the class action waiver under the NLRA does not inter-
fere with an employer’s dispute resolution policy. Thus, it does not
violate the FAA because employers can still restrict all individual claims
to arbitration, and the NLRB does not protect supervisors, casual em-
ployees, or confidential employees. Such a holding seemingly violates
the express language of Concepcion. As the Horton court stated: “Re-
gardless of whether employees resort to class procedures in an arbitral or
in a judicial forum, employers would be discouraged from individual
arbitration.”80
74 Adam Dougherty & Jacquelyn Thompson, NLRB’s Continuing Expansion of Off-Duty
Access Rights, 190 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (Oct. 1, 2014).
75 See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 359–62 (5th Cir. 2013); see also
AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011).
76 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 365–66.
77 Id. at 360.
78 Id. at 348.
79 Id.
80 D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 359.
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Since we believe the right to file a class action is not an absolute
right, we contend that the proper analysis is the historical balancing test.
Courts should judge the effects of eliminating the class action waiver on
employers, employees, and, we contend, society as a whole. Therefore
we need to determine if (1) the Horton court was correct when it stated
that eliminating class action waivers would undermine employers’ moti-
vations for implementing arbitration policies; (2) whether class action
waiver truly harms employees; and (3) whether arbitration class action
waivers harm or benefit society. Below, we discuss why employers im-
plement arbitration policies and the effects of such policies on employees
and society.
C. Why Employers Implement Mandatory Arbitration Policies
Detractors of mandatory arbitration imply that employers imple-
ment these policies to increase the probability of getting away with vio-
lating the law by making it harder for employees to bring claims and
obtain redress for viable claims. While there are likely “evil” employers
who do view arbitration as fulfilling such a purpose, we have studied
numerous Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) employers who are mo-
tivated by a desire to decrease litigation costs and create an employee
relations tool that will increase morale and reduce turnover. Indeed, one
company we are aware of makes its policy optional and employees who
agree to arbitration change their status from “at will” to “for cause.”
Of course, reducing litigation costs can be perceived as a laudable
goal or an effort to trample peoples’ rights. In order to subscribe to the
latter view, one must believe that employees do not file non-meritorious
claims and that winning, regardless of whether it is right, is what moti-
vates employers. While this could be true of some companies, those that
we studied used their ADR policies as a method for correcting the unac-
ceptable behavior. These companies are motivated by doing “the right
thing.” We are not saying that all of these companies are altruistic. They
may or may not be. Regardless, they all determined that violating em-
ployee rights is bad business, and thus sought to resolve claims with the
minimum amount of transaction costs.
Assuming that the employers implementing arbitration policies are
seeking to “do the right thing,” the question arises as to why class action
waivers are so vital to the process. The employers we have studied re-
gard their arbitration policies as an insurance type of risk-pooling en-
deavor. Sadly, the employers accept that, despite their best efforts, there
will be legal violations. In addition, there will be false claims. Those that
we have studied accept that they must settle the legitimate claims, but do
not want to endure the costs of litigation on the non-meritorious claims.
Moreover, they believe that their ADR policies, that almost always in-
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clude multi-step grievance procedures featuring mediation and other
ADR processes, lead to better results for employees and employers.
Eliminating class action waivers allows employees to opt out of the arbi-
tration process when their case is ripe by attempting to turn their issue
into a class-wide lawsuit. The costs required to defend the certification
process undermine the entire model of the ADR policy, and make it un-
tenable for employers.
D. Do Class Action Waivers Harm Employees?
The litany of publicized wage and hour class action settlements sup-
ports the view that class actions are an effective tool for employees who
have been wronged by employers.81 A closer look, however, shows that
class action settlements are, in fact, a boon for plaintiffs’ lawyers that
tend to provide little compensatory relief to employees. This fact begs
two questions. First, are employees harmed by the lack of class actions,
and second, are class actions the optimal way to address systemic legal
violations?
Seasoned class action plaintiffs and defense lawyers know that there
is a rhythm to employment class actions. The first priority for plaintiffs’
lawyers is the potential for a large damage award against a deep-pock-
eted employer. Next, the parties battle for the certification for the class.
At this point, the plaintiffs’ lawyers have a large investment in the case.
Defense lawyers are now in damage control mode. They work to knock
out certain aspects of the claim to make the settlement numbers manage-
able. This posturing increases the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ investments in their
cases, their costs, and thus, the amount of fees they need to recoup.82
When parties finally settle, the employer is comfortable with the
damage award and the plaintiffs’ lawyers sell the settlement to the em-
ployees. Are the employees justly compensated for their lost wages? Are
they satisfied with their share of the award? These are empirical ques-
81 See generally Dr. Stephanie Plancich, Neil Fanaroff, & Janeen McIntosh, Trends in
Wage and Hour Settlements: 2015 Update, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING (Jul. 14, 2015)
(identifying “total wage and hour settlement payments of $445 million in 2013, $400 million
in 2014, and $39 million through the first three months of 2015” and signaling to employers
that class action claims are an effective tool against employers’ wrongdoing).
82 See Gregg A. Gilman & David Sherwyn, Arbitration: A Positive Employment Tool
and Potential Antidote to Class Actions, 2 CORNELL HOSPITALITY LABOR & EMPLOYMENT
REPORT 1, 7 n.27 (2014), http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&
context=cihlerpubs (“Indeed, at Georgetown Law School’s Hospitality Law Conference (10/
25/13 Washington D.C.) four seasoned management lawyers, all labor and employment de-
partment chairs, Gregg Gilman (Davis & Gilbert) Carolyn Richmond (Fox Rothschild); David
Ritter (Barnes & Thornburg); Paul Wagner (Stokes, Wagner) stated that in their extensive
collective experience, class action settlements almost exclusively revolved around plaintiffs’
lawyers’ fees, and the amount of money that the employees would recover bordered on
inconsequential.”).
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tions that have not been addressed. The contention that eliminating class
actions is hurtful to employees is made without comparison to alternative
ways in which class-wide relief may be sought.83
In a workplace where employees contracted away their right to file
a class action, and a plaintiffs’ lawyer invested the time and energy to
discover a class-wide violation,84 the lawyer would file an arbitration
demand and arbitrate the best claim first. The plaintiffs’ lawyer would
then continue to arbitrate the same claim over and over at the employer’s
expense. The first case would not entail the class certification issue,
would not result in huge amounts of attorney time, and could be adjudi-
cated instead of settled. The employee would not have to use her award
to pay for the lawyers’ time. Instead, the lawyer would have her hourly
fee (as determined by the arbitrator and paid by the employer) and maybe
a small percentage of the award.
Of course, the employer could, after losing the first case, continue to
arbitrate this issue hundreds of times, but with genuine classes (i.e. where
the plaintiffs’ case features common issues of law and fact). However,
this is inefficient. If the first arbitration yielded a pro-employee decision,
the employer would not want to arbitrate the same claim again and again.
This would increase the odds that the employer would, for the purposes
of settlement, treat the group of putative employees as a class. Accord-
ingly, subsequent arbitration cases would likely be settled by focusing
exclusively on the employee’s lost wages because the legal issue would
be settled. The employer would pay what it owes, the employee would
get what she deserves, and the plaintiffs’ lawyers would lose a boondog-
gle. In short, reduced transactional costs associated with arbitration actu-
ally make repeat arbitration of class-wide violations more likely to yield
a greater percentage of surplus funds for wronged employees, compared
to attorneys and experts. Employees would thus be better off waiving
their right to class actions in many cases, and using arbitration as a lever
to gain de facto class status, but with a greater potential to yield available
83 The National Football League settled a lawsuit in which players sought redress for
concussions and other physical and mental injuries. The media reported the settlement as ac-
ceptable to the players, who did not get health insurance, as a pragmatic decision because it
could take years to actually litigate the case. See NFL CONCUSSION SETTLEMENT, https://nfl-
concussionsettlement.com/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2016).
84 Admittedly, mandatory arbitration might reduce the attractiveness of the settle-ability
of some class action claims, and thus reduce the likelihood that employees would be able to
find representation. However, employees with individual claims would likely still be able to
find representation (all else equal), and from there, the plaintiff-side attorney might discover
the patterned nature of the claims. At this point, because the lawyer has sunk costs associated
with the claim, it would be easier to bring repeated arbitration demands on behalf of other
similarly situated employees.
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damages.85 Employers would likely regard a class action ban as an ad-
vantage only because the violation of the law and the true lost wages, not
the costs of defense, would drive the settlement.
We therefore contend that class action waivers should be lawful if
one were to utilize the classic NLRB balancing test because eliminating
class action waivers hurts employers and does not truly help employees.
Inherent in this argument is the idea that arbitration in general does not
hurt employees. Moreover, as stated above, we believe that the balancing
test should not be limited to just employers and employees. Instead, the
effect of arbitration on society in general should be part of the balancing
test. In the remainder of this Article, we examine the current system and
assess whether it is the best use of government resources and the best
method for resolving disputes. We contend it is not, and that not only
should arbitration be lawful, it should be actively encouraged by the
EEOC, the NLRB, other government agencies, and the law in general.
II. WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM?
Absent from most articles extolling the evils of arbitration is an in-
depth, and often any, discussion of the alternative to arbitration: the ad-
ministrative agency and litigation process. As any employment litigator
or litigant knows, this agency/litigation process is, at best, flawed, and at
worst, an awful method for resolving employment disputes. It is slow,
expensive, combative, formal, non-accommodating, and rarely results in
a verdict. In fact, we contend that in discrimination cases, the system is
so broken that justice is not even a consideration. Instead of justice, ex-
pedience and personal or organizational goals drive process and results.
A. The EEOC Process
As all discrimination law observers know, claimants cannot file
complaints in federal court or state court without first going through an
administrative agency. Since each state has its own procedures, it makes
the most sense to examine the federal system: the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Filing with the EEOC is the first step in seeking redress for a viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),86 the Age
85 This assumes that the likelihood of employees finding suitable representation is ap-
proximately the same or greater with a mandatory arbitration agreement in place in a given
workplace. However, as noted in the previous footnote, it is possible that a mandatory arbitra-
tion agreement in place would reduce the likelihood of employees obtaining suitable represen-
tation. Given the greater share of damages awardable and reduced transaction costs, this
remains an unaddressed empirical question. However, what is clear is that the definitive claim
that banning class wide relief must make all employees worse off rings somewhat hollow
given the parameters identified in this article.
86 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),87 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).88 The EEOC process is relatively straightfor-
ward. The Commission takes the claim, contacts the employer, seeks to
resolves the claim, and if it cannot do so, investigates and then makes a
finding as to whether there is probable cause.89 At that point, the claim-
ant can file the case in federal court.90 If the case rises to the necessary
level of importance for the Commission, it takes the case and assumes
the role of the plaintiff.91 The problem is that the EEOC is overworked,
under-funded and is dealing with a population that does not really under-
stand the law. Thus, the system is, at best, inefficient and, at worst, fea-
tures perverse incentives under which bad actors, on either side, can use
it to circumvent justice. Below we explain the details of this system, the
perverse incentives, and the lack of justice inherent in the resolutions.
Upon receiving a charge, the EEOC makes a categorical determina-
tion as to whether the case is an A, B, or C.92 According to the EEOC’s
national enforcement plan, the labels mean the following:
A. Cases involving violations of established anti-dis-
crimination principles, whether on an individual or sys-
temic basis, including Commissioner charge cases
raising issues under the NEP, which by their nature
could have a potential significant impact beyond the par-
ties to the particular dispute.
1. Cases involving repeated and/or egregious discrim-
ination, including harassment, or facially discrimina-
tory policies.
2.  Challenges to broad-based employment practices
affecting many employees or applicants for employ-
ment, such as cases alleging patterns of discrimination
in hiring, lay-offs, job mobility, including “glass-ceil-
ing” cases, and/or pay, including claims under the
Equal Pay Act.
B.  Cases having the potential of promoting the develop-
ment of law supporting the antidiscrimination purposes
of the statutes enforced by the Commission.
87 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012).
88 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
89 See Saving the Baby, supra note 1, at 80–81.
90 Id. at 80.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 84–86; U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PLAN (1997), https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/plan/nep.cfm.
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1.  Claims presenting unresolved issues of statutory
interpretation under one or more of the statutes en-
forced by the Commission, as follows:
a.  Claims presenting unresolved questions regard-
ing the allocation of burdens in disparate treatment
cases as set forth in St. Mary’s Honor Center v.
Hicks.
b.  Claims presenting questions regarding the scope
of liability under the statutes enforced by the Com-
mission, including issues of employer liability in
harassment cases and individual liability.
c.  Claims of national origin discrimination involv-
ing language issues, including accent discrimina-
tion and restrictive language policies or practices.
d.  Claims clarifying the Title VII duty to reasona-
bly accommodate religious practices.
e.  Claims raising unresolved questions under the
Americans with Disabilities Act regarding the
meaning of “reasonable accommodation” and the
term “qualified individual with a disability,” as
well as the defenses of “undue hardship” and “di-
rect threat.”
f.  Claims presenting questions regarding the inter-
pretation of the prohibition of disparate impact dis-
crimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the
Americans With Disabilities Act.
g.  Claims based on the intersection of two or more
prohibited bases of discrimination (e.g., discrimina-
tion against women of color, older women, or mi-
nority persons with disabilities).
h.  Claims addressing the legality of agreements
that mandate binding arbitration of employment
discrimination disputes imposed as a condition of
initial or continued employment.
i.  Claims presenting unresolved issues regarding
the provision of employee benefits, including
claims arising under Title I of the Older Workers
Benefits Protection Act, and the Americans With
Disabilities Act.
j.  Claims of comparable significance identified and
approved in the Local Enforcement Plans.
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2.  Cases involving legal issues where there is a con-
flict in the federal circuit courts on a Plan priority or
in which the Commission is seeking Supreme Court
resolution of such issue.
C.  Cases involving the integrity or effectiveness of the
Commission’s enforcement process, particularly the in-
vestigation and conciliation of charges.
1.  Cases involving allegations of retaliation against
persons for participating in Commission proceedings
or opposing unlawful employment discrimination,
particularly cases where the scope of the statutory
protection against retaliation is at issue.
2.  Cases presenting challenges to Commission policy
declarations, such as guidelines, regulations or policy
guidance.
3.  Cases protecting Commission access to informa-
tion, including subpoena enforcement proceedings
and proceedings to preserve or prevent the loss or de-
struction of evidence, except as set forth in paragraph
5 below.
4.  Cases involving allegations of a material breach of
an agreement to which the Commission was a party
settling an earlier proceeding.
5.  Cases involving alleged violations of the Commis-
sion’s recordkeeping and reporting requirements
where there is reason to believe that there may be an-
other violation of statutes enforced by the
Commission.93
The EEOC aggressively pursues many of its “A” cases and it is
impossible to overestimate the effects of these cases. Indeed, the EEOC
has litigated cases that have truly altered the employment discrimination
landscape in the United States. We contend that the EEOC does an excel-
lent job with the A cases it litigates, even when it does not prevail. Cases
that define the law for employers and employees are valuable to society
regardless of which side prevails. In fact, the EEOC’s “greatest hits” of
litigated cases is not just impressive, it is groundbreaking.
Since the enforcement plan went into effect, the EEOC has litigated,
among others, the following “game-changing” cases:
93 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PLAN (1997), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/
nep.cfm.
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B. EEOC Litigation
a. Racial Harassment
• EEOC v. Patterson-UTI Drilling Company, LLC94: The EEOC’s
Phoenix District Office entered into a $14.5 million settlement
and consent decree with Patterson-UTI, a Texas-based, multi-
state oil drilling company. The EEOC alleged that Patterson-UTI
unlawfully maintained a nationwide practice of race-based dis-
crimination, harassment, and retaliation. Unlawful practices in-
cluded assigning minorities to the lowest level jobs, failing to
train and promote minorities, and disciplining and demoting mi-
nority employees disproportionately. Those employees who op-
posed the harassing conduct were subject to retaliation such as
discipline or discharge.
• EEOC v. Hillshire Brands Co. f/k/a Sara Lee Corp.95: Hillshire
Brands Company agreed to pay $ 4 million dollars to seventy-
four African-American former employees to settle a hostile work
environment suit. African-American employees were subjected
to racist slurs and graffiti and despite their complaints, the dis-
crimination was not addressed.
• EEOC v. A.C. Widenhouse96: Race harassment case on behalf of
two victims. Jury verdict in January 2013 for $200,000 in com-
pensatory and punitive damages.
• EEOC v. AA Foundries97: Race harassment on behalf of multiple
victims. Jury verdict in September 2012 for $200,000 in punitive
damages.
94 Case No. 15-cv-00600-WYD-CBS (D. Colo. 2015); Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm’n , Patterson-UTI Drilling to Pay $14.5 Million to Settle Claims of Race/
National Origin Discrimination (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/re-
lease/4-20-15.cfm.
95 Case No. 2:15-cv-1347 (E.D. Tex. 2015); Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n, Hillshire Brands Company Pays $4 Million to Settle Race Discrimination Suit (Dec.
22, 2015), https://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/12-22-15.cfm.
96 No. 1:11–cv–498, 2013 WL 664230 (M.D. N.C. Feb. 22, 2013), aff’d, 576 Fed. App’x
227 (4th Cir. 2014); Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Jury Awards
$200,000 in Damages Against A.C. Widenhouse in EEOC Race Harassment Suit (Feb. 1,
2013), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-1-13.cfm.
97 No. 5:11-cv-792 (W.D. Tex. 2011); Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n, Court Orders AA Foundries to Take Extensive Measures to Prevent Racial Harass-
ment (Oct. 12, 2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/10-12-12.cfm.
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b. Disparate Impact Cases
• EEOC v. BMW Manufacturing Co., LLC98: Settlement of $1.6
million in race case challenging disparate impact of criminal
conviction policy applied to long-term employees of contractor.
• EEOC v. Pepsi99: Public conciliation for $3 million for more
than 300 African Americans adversely affected by criminal
background check policy.
• EEOC v. Kaplan100: Appellate court affirmed grant of summary
judgment to employer dismissing credit screen policy and ex-
cluding EEOC expert witness on disparate impact.
• EEOC v. Freeman101: Appellate court affirmed grant of sum-
mary judgment to employer in nationwide race discrimination
case challenging disparate impact of felony conviction screens.
• EEOC v. Dollar General102: Nationwide race discrimination
case challenging disparate impact of criminal background check
policy for all positions.
• EEOC v. Crothall103: The District court ruled employer is obli-
gated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to maintain
records showing adverse impact of selection procedures, that the
EEOC had the legal authority to issue the UGESP regulation that
required recordkeeping, and that compliance with the EEOC’s
rule was mandatory and not “permissive.”
c. ADA Accommodations
• EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc. d/b/a Gulf Coast Homecare104: The
Fifth Circuit affirmed, in part, the lower court’s granting of sum-
mary judgment against the EEOC. Clarifying the long-standing
circuit split on proving a prima facie case under the ADA, the
Fifth Circuit held that an employee must show “he was subject
to an adverse employment decision on account of his disabil-
98 Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, BMW to Pay $1.6 Million and
Offer Jobs to Settle Federal Race Discrimination Lawsuit (Sept. 8, 2015), https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-8-15.cfm.
99 Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Pepsi to Pay $3.13 Million and
Made Major Policy Changes to Resolve EEOC Finding of Nationwide Hiring Discrimination
Against African Americans (Jan. 11, 2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-
11-12a.cfm.
100 748 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 2014).
101 778 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2015).
102 EEOC v. DolGenCorp, LLC, No. 13-cv-04307, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80140, at
*1–12 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2015).
103 EEOC v. Crothall Servs. Grp., No. 15-3812, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83520, at *1–21
(E.D. Pa. June 28, 2016).
104 773 F. 3d 688 (5th Cir. 2014)
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ity”.105 The court remanded to resolve the disputed issues of ma-
terial fact.106
• EEOC v. Ford Motor Co.107: In an 8-5 decision, the Sixth Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel’s decision, and granted
summary judgment for Ford. The court held that as a matter of
law, the charging party, a resale buyer, was not qualified for her
job due to unpredictable absences caused by her disability. The
Court stated that regular in-person attendance was an essential
function of most positions, and that telecommuting, as proposed
in this case, was not a reasonable accommodation.108
• EEOC v. United Airlines109: Effectively sitting en banc, the
court reversed prior Seventh Circuit precedent and held that
“best qualified” policies do not trump the ADA’s reassignment-
as-reasonable-accommodation obligation.
• EEOC v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.110: Judge held that
Defendant’s “no-return policy” violated the ADA as a matter of
law and amounted to a denial of reasonable accommodation to
the Charging Party. Jury verdict for $119,612 in back pay.111
• EEOC v. Supervalu, Inc.112: Court order requiring the company
to cover such costs arising in a contempt proceeding brought
against it for violations of a previously agreed upon consent de-
cree resolving prior EEOC litigation against the company under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), in which the agency
charged that the company routinely failed to provide reasonable
accommodations to employees seeking to return to work from a
disability leave.113 Contempt action recently settled.114
• EEOC v. UPS115: Court denied UPS’s motion to dismiss, finding
that the 100% return-to-work policy could be a job qualification
under the ADA.
105 Id. at 697.
106 Id.
107 752 F. 3d 634 (6th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
108 Id.
109 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013).
110 No. 11-2153, 2013 WL 3230670 (W.D. Ark. 2013).
111 Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Jury in EEOC Suit Says Old
Dominion Freight Line Must Pay Former Driver $119,612 for Disability Bias (Jan. 16, 15),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-16-15.cfm.
112 No. 09 C 5637, 2014 WL 6791853, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
113 Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Supervalu/Jewel-Osco To Pay
$3.2 Million Under Consent Decree For Disability Bias (Jan. 5, 2011), https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/newsroom/release/1-5-11a.cfm.
114 Id.
115 EEOC v. UPS, No. 09 C 5291, 2014 WL 538577, at *1, 4–5 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
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• EEOC v. Creative Networks116: Court denied the company’s mo-
tion for partial summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the company maintained a rigid pol-
icy of refusing to provide an ASL interpreter at orientation and
training for deaf and hearing-impaired employees.
d. Preserving Access to the Legal System
• EEOC v. Cognis Corp.117: Summary judgment for EEOC was
granted in part, and denied in part, questioning whether a last
chance agreement dissuaded employees from filing of an EEOC
charge.
• EEOC v. Evans Fruit118: EEOC obtained preliminary injunction
prohibiting retaliation.
• EEOC v. New Breed Logistics119: The Sixth Circuit upheld a
jury verdict for the EEOC against New Breed Logistics. The jury
awarded more than $1.5 million to three female employees after
finding that they were sexually harassed by a New Breed super-
visor and retaliated against after they objected to his sexual ad-
vances. Additionally, the jury found that a male employee, who
verbally opposed the harassment and supported the women’s
complaints, was also retaliated against. The Sixth Circuit’s opin-
ion clarified the scope of protected activity under the opposition
clause of Title VII’s retaliation provision. The Court, in a case of
first impression, held that the “opposition clause” of Title VII
has an “expansive definition” and courts should give “great def-
erence” to the EEOC’s interpretation of opposing conduct.
e. EEOC and Sex Hiring Discrimination
• EEOC v. Mavis Discount Tire120: EEOC alleged Mavis Discount
Tire refused to hire women for a wide variety of positions de-
spite some applicants’ superior qualifications and thus engaged
in a pattern or practice of sex discrimination. Since at least 2008,
only one woman was employed in any of these positions out of
approximately 800 employees. Out of 1,300 hires made between
2008-2010 for those positions, not one was female. Additionally,
despite Mavis’s alleged failure to maintain applications—itself a
116 912 F. Supp. 2d 828, 844, 847 (D. Ariz. 2012).
117 10-CV-2182, 2012 WL 1893725, at *1, 14 (C.D. Ill. 2012).
118 No. CV-10-3033-LRS (E.D. Wash. 2010) (order granting application for temporary
restraining order).
119 783 F. 3d 1057 (6th Cir. 2015).
120 Complaint, EEOC v. Mavis Discount Tire, Inc., No.112-cv-00741-JGK (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
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separate violation of federal law—those applications available
indicated that women with superior credentials and experience
were rejected while less qualified men were hired. The case was
settled for $2.1 million, to be divided among forty-six aggrieved
women.121
• EEOC v. New Prime, Inc.122: EEOC alleged that New Prime,
Inc. failed to hire women for trucking positions. Court granted
summary judgment in favor of EEOC finding Defendant en-
gaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination. The case settled
for $3.1 million in damages and extensive injunctive relief, in-
cluding job offers to women who were denied hire.123
• EEOC v. Presrite Corp.124: The EEOC alleged Presrite failed to
hire women for metal forging jobs. The case settled for $700,000
and non-monetary relief including forty priority hires, and re-
vised hiring policies.125
• EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.126: EEOC alleged Wal-Mart en-
gaged in systemic failure to hire women for warehouse positions.
Settled for $11.7 million and broad non-monetary relief, includ-
ing validation of interview questions and more than 50 positions
for eligible claimants.
• EEOC v. Unit Drilling Company127: EEOC alleged that Unit
Drilling refused to hire any women nationwide on its oil rigs,
and rejected female applicants testified that they were told by
Unit employees that the company did not hire women because it
only had “man camps,” that women were “too pretty” and that
their presence would “distract the men.” Settled for $400,000 to
five women and extensive injunctive including change of its pol-
icies, provide training against sex discrimination, post anti-dis-
crimination notices, and provide detailed hiring information to
the EEOC, which will monitor Unit Drilling’s compliance with
the decree.
121 Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Mavis Discount Tire to Pay
$2.1 Million to Settle EEOC Class Sex Discrimination Lawsuit (Mar. 25, 2016), https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/3-25-16.cfm.
122 42 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (W.D. Mo. 2014).
123 Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Prime, Inc. to Pay Over $3
Million After Court Ruled It Used Discriminatory Hiring Practices (May 31, 2016), https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-31-16a.cfm.
124 Consent Decree, EEOC v. Presrite Corp., No. 11-cv-260 (N.D. Ohio 2011).
125 See EEOC, RESOLUTIONS: SELECTED LIST OF EEOC SYSTEMIC HIRING RESOLUTIONS
AND FILINGS SINCE 2005 (Apr. 18, 2012).
126 Consent Decree, EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-cv-339-KKC (E.D. Ky.
2001).
127 Consent Decree, EEOC v. Unit Drilling Co., No. 13-cv-00147-TCK-PJC (D. Okla.
2015).
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f. EEOC & Discrimination Against Immigrant, Migrant, and
Other Vulnerable Workers
• EEOC v. Moreno Farms, Inc.128: A federal jury returned a unan-
imous verdict awarding a total of $17,425,000 to five former fe-
male employees of Moreno Farms, Inc., a produce growing and
packing operation in Felda, Florida, who suffered sexual harass-
ment and retaliation.
• Chellen v. John Pickle Co.129: Class, race, and national origin
case alleging oil industry parts manufacturer subjected East In-
dian workers to discriminatory pay and working conditions. The
court awarded $1.24 million.
• David v. Signal International130: Signal International, a Alabama
ship building and repair company used the H-2B guest worker
program to recruit workers in the wake of hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. Guest workers from India were subjected to a pattern or
practice of race and national origin discrimination, including un-
favorable working conditions and forcing workers to pay to live
in overcrowded and unsanitary camps under guard. After the
EEOC brought suit, Signal International settled for $5 million
dollars and issued a statement acknowledging wrongdoing and
apologizing.131
• EEOC v. Vail Run Resort Community Association132: Vail Run
and its management company, Global Hospitality Resorts, Inc.,
will pay $1,020,000 as part of the settlement of a sexual harass-
ment, national origin discrimination and retaliation lawsuit. The
EEOC claimed the defendants violated federal law by allowing a
male housekeeping manager to sexually harass Mexican female
employees, which included propositions, groping, and attempted
rape. The EEOC asserted the manager targeted Mexican immi-
grants who were particularly vulnerable, threatening them with
job loss and deportation, and the defendants retaliated against
men and women who complained about the harassment to man-
agement and the owner with discipline and discharge.
128 See Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Wins Jury Verdict
of Over $17 Million for Victims of Sexual Harassment and Retaliation at Moreno Farms (Sep.
10, 2015), https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/release/9-10-15.cfm?renderforprint=1.
129 Chellen v. John Pickle Co., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Okla. 2006).
130 David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, No. 12-557 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2013) (order granting motion
for entry of discovery plan and case management order).
131 Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Signal International, LLC To
Pay $5 Million To Settle EEOC Race, National Origin Lawsuit (Dec. 18, 2015), https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/12-18-15.cfm.
132 Consent Decree, EEOC v. Vail Run Resort Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. et al., No. 15-CV-
01592-RPM-KMT (D. Colo. 2016).
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• EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc.133: National origin and race har-
assment case involving Thai farm workers. The case settled in
November 2013 for $1.2 million and innovative, comprehensive
equitable relief.
g. The EEOC and LBGT Coverage
• EEOC v. Maritime Autowash, Inc.134: Maritime Autowash did
not produce information related to the EEOC’s investigation of a
charge of alleging national origin and retaliation. Maritime re-
fused to fully comply with the subpoena, claiming that Title VII
may not apply to the plaintiff as an undocumented person. The
district court agreed and dismissed EEOC subpoena enforcement
action. The Fourth Circuit overturned the district court and re-
manded with instructions to enforce EEOC subpoena.
• Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Mississippi135: Pattern or practice hos-
tile work environment based on sex, race and/or national origin
and retaliation against a class of female and male Hispanic em-
ployees in a poultry processing plant.
• Macy v. Holder136: The Commission ruled that employment dis-
crimination against employees because they are transgender, be-
cause of their gender identity, and/or because they have
transitioned (or intend to transition) is discrimination because on
sex, and thus violates Title VII.137
• Lusardi v. McHugh138: The EEOC issued a ruling that the De-
partment of the Army discriminated against a transgender em-
ployee who during her employment transitioned from presenting
as a man, to presenting as a woman, consistent with her gender
identity. The EEOC found that the Department of the Army un-
lawfully discriminated by conditioning her access to the desig-
nated, common female restroom used by all other female
employees on the completion of her gender reassignment surgery
and by intentionally failing to address her by feminine
pronouns.139
133 7 F. Supp. 3d 1053 (D. Haw. 2014); Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n, Del Monte Fresh Produce Agrees to Settle EEOC Farmworker National Origin Law-
suit, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/11-18-13a.cfm.
134 EEOC v. Mar. Autowash, Inc., 820 F.3d 662 (4th Cir. 2016).
135 Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., No. 15-60562, 2016 U.S. App. Bloomberg
Law 318550 (5th Cir. 2016).
136 Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (eResolution Apr. 20, 2012), https://
www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120120821 Macy v DOJ ATF.txt
137 Id.
138 Lusardi v. McHugh, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133395 (Apr. 1, 2015).
139 Id.
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• Baldwin v. Department of Transportation140: Baldwin alleged
that the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) discriminated against
him on the basis of his sexual orientation: he alleged that his
manager made disparaging comments to him and others about
his sexual orientation, and that he was not promoted to a perma-
nent Front Line Manager position at the Miami airport’s Air
Traffic Control Tower because he is gay. The court held that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation included in the
prohibition against sex discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Allegations of discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation always and necessarily state claims of
discrimination on the basis of sex. In other words, if an em-
ployee is discriminated against because s/he is gay, the employee
will be able to show that the discrimination s/he experienced was
sex discrimination. This is because it is impossible to consider
someone’s sexual orientation without considering their sex and
the sex of the person(s) with whom the employee is romantically
involved; and/or because the discrimination is based on a belief
that men should only be attracted to women and women to men,
which is a fundamental sex stereotype, norm, or expectation.
• EEOC v. Lakeland Eye Clinic141: The EEOC recently filed this
case on behalf of transgender charging parties in Florida. In
Lakeland Eye, the theory of coverage was based on Glenn v.
Brumby.142 On April 9, 2015, the EEOC entered into a historic
$150,000 settlement and consent decree with Lakeland Eye
Clinic. Additionally, Lakeland agreed to implement a new gen-
der discrimination policy and provide training to management
and employees regarding transgender/gender stereotype
discrimination.
• EEOC v. Deluxe Financial Services, Inc.143: The EEOC alleges
Charging Party had performed her duties satisfactorily in the
company’s Phoenix offices throughout a lengthy tenure there.
However, after she began to present at work as a woman and
informed her supervisors that she was transgender, Deluxe re-
140 Baldwin v. Dep’t of Transp., EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (eResolution July 15,
2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120133080.pdf.
141 Consent Decree at 4, EEOC v. Lakeland Eye Clinic, No. 8:14-cv-2421-T35 AEP
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2015); EEOC, FACT SHEET: RECENT EEOC LITIGATION REGARDING TITLE
VII & LGBT-RELATED DISCRIMINATION (July 8, 2016), https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/litiga-
tion/selected/lgbt_facts.cfm?renderforprint=1
142 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (considering claim under § 1983, the court stated that
“discrimination against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex
discrimination, whether it’s described as being on the basis of sex or gender”).
143 No. 15-cv-02646 (D. Minn. 2015).
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fused to let her use the women’s restroom. Supervisors and co-
workers subjected the charging employee to a hostile work
environment, including hurtful epithets and intentionally using
the incorrect gender pronouns in reference to her.
• EEOC v. Pallet Companies, Inc.144: The EEOC sued IFCO, a
provider of reusable plastic containers, alleging that it discrimi-
nated against Yolanda Boone on the basis of sex by terminating
her for complaining about harassment. The EEOC alleged that
Boone, a lesbian woman, was harassed because of her sexual
orientation and/or her non-conformity with the employer’s gen-
der-based expectations, preferences, or stereotypes in violation
of Title VII. According to the EEOC’s lawsuit, Boone’s supervi-
sor harassed Boone by repeatedly making comments, sometimes
accompanied by sexually suggestive gestures, about her sexual
orientation and nonconformity with stereotypical female gender
norms. A few days after Boone complained to management and
called IFCO’s employee hotline to complain, IFCO terminated
her employment in retaliation. In addition to monetary relief of
$202,200, the consent decree enjoins IFCO from engaging in sex
discrimination or retaliation in the future. Additionally, the de-
cree requires, inter alia, IFCO to retain an expert on sexual ori-
entation, gender identity, and transgender training to assist in
developing a training program for IFCO’s staff on LGBT work-
place issues.
• EEOC v. Scott Medical Health Center145: The EEOC alleged
that a gay male employee was subjected to harassment because
of his sexual orientation in violation of Title VII. The employee
subsequently quit after enduring weeks of offensive comments
from his supervisor.
• Burrows v. College of Central Florida146: EEOC argued, as ami-
cus, that sexual orientation discrimination is covered under Title
VII because of the prohibitions against discrimination based on
sex stereotypes, association and gender.
• Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, Inc.147: EEOC argued, as
amicus, that sexual orientation discrimination is covered under
Title VII because of the prohibitions against discrimination
144 Consent Decree at 3–4, EEOC v. Pallet Cos., No. 1:16-cv-00595-CCB (D. Md. June
28, 2016).
145 Complaint, EEOC v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., No. 2:16-cv-00225-CB (W.D. Pa. Mar.
1, 2016).
146 Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Burrows v. Coll. of Cent.
Fla., No. 15-14554 (11th Cir. 2016).
147 Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Evans v. Georgia Reg’l
Hosp., No. 15-14554 (11th Cir. 2016).
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based on sex stereotypes, association, and gender. In addition,
EEOC argues retaliation is unlawful if the employee reasonably
believes unlawful activities occurred and, in this case, the plain-
tiff’s belief was objectively reasonable.
• Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc.148: The EEOC filed an
amicus curie brief in support of Christiansen, arguing that sexual
orientation discrimination is cognizable as sex discrimination
under Title VII. EEOC argued that the Second Circuit should
reconsider its Simonton v. Runyon decision for two reasons: the
legal underpinnings for the decision have shifted, and the rule
that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation is outdated.
• EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.149: The EEOC
alleges that defendant discriminated based on sex by firing a
Garden City, Michigan, funeral director/embalmer because she
is transgender, because she was transitioning from male to fe-
male, and/or because she did not conform to the employer’s gen-
der-based expectations, preferences, or stereotypes. EEOC
alleges the charging party had always performed satisfactorily.
However, after working at the defendant for about six years, she
gave Harris a letter explaining she was undergoing a gender tran-
sition from male to female and would soon start to present in
appropriate business attire at work. EEOC contends that two
weeks later, Harris’s owner fired her, telling her what was “pro-
posing to do” was unacceptable. The Commission recently sur-
vived defendant’s motion to dismiss.
• Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC150: Broussard and the
EEOC, as intervenor, allege that Mississippi-based First Tower
Loan, LLC violated federal law by firing a Lake Charles, Louisi-
ana, manager-trainee because he is transgender, and/or because
he did not conform to the employer’s gender-based expectations,
preferences or stereotypes. EEOC is seeking injunctive relief
prohibiting First Tower Loan from engaging in unlawful sex dis-
crimination in the future, as well as lost wages, compensatory
and punitive damages for Broussard, and other relief the court
deems proper. The case was stayed for arbitration.
148 Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Anonymous v. Christiansen,
No. 16-748 (2nd Cir. 2016).
149 Complaint, EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-13710-
SFC-DRG (E.D. Mich. filed Sept. 25, 2014).
150 Complaint, Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS (E.D.
Pa. 2015).
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h. EEOC and religious discrimination
• EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch151: “Whether an employer can
be liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for
refusing to hire an applicant or discharging an employee based
on a ‘religious observance and practice’ only if the employer has
actual knowledge that a religious accommodation was required
and the employer’s actual knowledge resulted from direct, ex-
plicit notice from the applicant or employee.”152 A divided panel
reversed summary judgment for the EEOC and ordered the dis-
missal of the case in a case involving the denial of job to Muslim
applicant with hijab because the charging party to did not put the
company on sufficient notice of her need for an accommoda-
tion.153 Nine amicus briefs were filed in support of EEOC by
various organizations including Beckett Fund, a coalition of Or-
thodox Jewish groups, Seventh Day Adventists and other relig-
ious groups, CAIR, and Lambda Legal.154 Three briefs were
filed in support of Abercrombie, including by US Chamber of
Commerce and EEAC.155
• EEOC v. Consol Energy, Inc. & Consolidation Coal Co.156: De-
fendant installed a time and attendance biometric hand scanner
to track time and attendance. EEOC alleged the employee re-
peatedly told management officials that submitting to a biomet-
ric hand scanner violated his sincerely held religious beliefs as
an Evangelical Christian. The employee was forced to retire be-
cause the employer refused to accommodate his religious beliefs.
The jury returned a verdict of $150,000 in compensatory dam-
ages and the district judge subsequently determined that the de-
fendant must pay an additional $436,860 to the employee for
back pay and front pay.
• EEOC v. Fries Restaurant Management, LLC d/b/a Burger
King157: Despite being told during job interview that she could
wear a skirt, in adherence with her Pentecostal beliefs, applicant
151 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
152 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 14-86
(U.S. July 25, 2014).
153 Id. at 8.
154 Docket, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 14-86 (U.S. July 25, 2014).
155 Id.
156 No. 13-cv-00215 FPS (N.D. W. Va. 2015).
157 Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Burger King Franchisee Settles
EEOC Discrimination Lawsuit (Jan. 23, 2013), https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/re
lease/1-23-13.cfm?renderforprint=1.
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was sent home during orientation and never brought back to
work. The case was settled for $25,000.158
• EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc.159: Suit alleged the employer subjected
employee, who had converted to the Sikh religion, to harassment
and refused to accommodate his religious need to wear a turban.
Resolved in nationwide consent decree in March 2012 for
$75,000 and injunctive relief.
C. EEOC Investigations
In addition to litigation, the EEOC has dedicated resources to
preventing employment discrimination through education and outreach
by working with new and small businesses and employees. For example,
in 2015 the EEOC conducted over 3700 no-cost outreach events and
reached 336,855 individuals. The EEOC no-cost outreach events were
attended by 23,790 small business representatives and the EEOC entered
into 235 partnerships with groups that represent small businesses.160
These facts simply scratch the service of all the positive work the EEOC
does with regard to litigation and outreach efforts. It is clear that the
EEOC is an effective litigator and educator—the problem is that the
EEOC simply does not have the resources to resolve “garden variety”
discrimination claims. Thus, these cases could be better served with an-
other system.
The EEOC system is not an exact science and the different offices
are free to create their own standards.161 Still, there is enough in common
to report a fairly clear understanding of the how the system works.162
The intake officers provide three services: they begin the file, counsel the
employee, and label the case.163 The first task is obvious. The counseling
occurs when the charging party is alleging treatment that does not violate
the law.164 For example, a party may allege “My supervisor treats me
poorly because I’m a Mets fan and she likes the Yankees.” While one of
the authors may argue that being a Mets fan should be a protected class,
158 Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Burger King Franchisee Settles
EEOC Discrimination Lawsuit (Jan. 23, 2013), https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/re
lease/1-23-13.cfm?renderforprint=1.
159 No. 10-cv-11648-WGY (E.D. Mass. 2012); Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportu-
nity Comm’n, AutoZone to Pay $75,000 to Settle EEOC Religious Discrimination Lawsuit
(Mar. 30, 2012), https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/release/3-30-12a.cfm?renderfor
print=1.
160 See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2015 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2015par.pdf.
161 Interview with Patrick David Lopez, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, in Wash., D.C. (July 14, 2016).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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it is not, and the intake officer would counsel the charging party not to
file a case. The third task is labeling the case either an A, B, or C.165 For
practical purposes, a charge will be labeled an A if: (1) it fits into the
national enforcement plan (systemic discrimination, transgender or orien-
tation, religious accommodation) or the EEOC wants to litigate it (for
example, a class action or an outrageous accusation).166 Garden variety
cases, a “he said, she said,” an unfair discharge, or failure to hire claim
will be a B case. The EEOC labels a case a C when it is “self-defeating”
— that is to say that because of facts and law, it is destined to be
dismissed.167
The priority enforcement plan was a good faith and effective
method for the EEOC to move away from its prior policy of fully investi-
gating every charge. Full investigation for all charges, in theory, seems to
be a fair and equitable policy. In reality, it grinded the EEOC system to a
halt. Legitimate charges would sit for years as investigators wasted time
on charges that clearly had no merit. Something had to be done. It was,
and it has worked. As stated above, the EEOC’s handling of those cases
it litigates is to be lauded. The problem lies with A charges that are not
litigated, and the B and the C charges. The EEOC essentially dismisses C
charges. Frankly, many of these charges should be dismissed. However,
it seems likely that intake officers will make mistakes and these mistakes
mean that some meritorious charges are essentially dead on arrival.
Moreover, while some of these charges do not violate the law, society
would be better off if the employer and the employee communicated and
resolved the conflict instead of the EEOC simply dismissing the case
without investigation. The EEOC does investigate and attempt to concili-
ate the non-litigated A cases and the B cases. The statistical reporting,
unfortunately, reports all resolutions, so we cannot trace the different re-
sults for A, B, and C cases. Below, we report these statistics and provide
a real-world timeline for a fully investigated charge.
In 2015, the EEOC resolved 92,641 cases.168 Of those resolved
cases, 16,761 (18.1%) were labeled as merit resolutions. Merit resolu-
tions consist of cases where: (1) the EEOC found cause (3,239 or 3.5%);
(2) settled (8,221 or 8.9%); or (3) withdrew with benefits (5,301 or
5.7%).169 After the EEOC finds “cause” it attempts to help the parties
conciliate. Of the 3,239 conciliation attempts, the EEOC was successful
1,432 times and unsuccessful 1,807 times. Conversely, 65,880 (81.9%)
cases were determined to be without merit. Of those non-meritorious
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ALL STATUTES FY 1997 – FY 2015 (2015),
https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm?renderforprint=1.
169 See id.
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cases, 60,440 (65.2%) were the result of a no cause finding and 15,440
(16.7%) cases were administratively closed.170 The results from 2015
were fairly typical. From 1997 to 2015 the percentage of merit resolu-
tions ranged from a high of 22.90 in 2007 to a low of 11.00 in 1997. The
late 19990’s featured the three lowest years for merit resolutions:
11.00%, 12.40% and 16.50% respectfully. After 1999 eight of the fifteen
years had merit resolutions above 20% and never lower than 17.20%.171
These statistics beg the question: why are 77.1% to 89% of the
cases deemed non-meritorious, and regardless of the answer to the first
question, is this system the best use of EEOC time and resources? With
regard to the reason the resolutions so starkly non-meritorious, one an-
swer could be that the vast majority of cases are just that – without merit.
Delving into the categories, however, one can question the administrative
closings which ranged from 28.30% to 14.80% (16.7% for a total of
15,440 in 2015). As stated above, administrative closings include cases
where the charging party did not respond to EEOC communications or
the EEOC could not locate the party.172 It is possible that in many of
these cases the charging party simply got frustrated or could not pursue
the case, because getting time off work to sue one’s former employer is
not a great career move. Of course, without examining each file, there is
no way to know if any of the administratively closed cases had merit and
“slipped through the cracks,” but it does seem possible. The cases dis-
missed as having no cause ranged from 57.2% to 67.9% (65.2% in
2015).173 What is clear, we contend, is that investigating over one mil-
lion charges that yielded no cause findings in nineteen years is not the
best use of EEOC time and government money, and it does not yield
justice. To support our contention, we must explain how full EEOC in-
vestigations really work.
The process of investigating B and C cases, according to numerous
lawyers interviewed, proceeds as follows:
1.  The charging party files a charge with the EEOC.
2.  Within a short period of time, the EEOC notifies the
employer that there is a charge, but states that no action
is required.
170 Id. It should be noted that charges closed for administrative reasons include: failure to
locate charging party, charging party failed to respond to EEOC communications, charging
party refused to accept full relief, closed due to the outcome of related litigation which estab-
lishes a precedent that makes further processing of the charge futile, charging party requests
withdrawal of a charge without receiving benefits or having resolved the issue, and no statu-
tory jurisdiction exists.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See id.
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3.  Approximately thirty days later, the employer re-
ceives a letter asking for a position statement and, if the
employee desires, a request to mediate. The employer
can accept or reject the mediation request. Regardless,
the employer then negotiates for more time to file the
position statement. It is standard to get 60 days to file.
Assuming there is no mediation, the position statement
is filed and now the case sits.
4.  In most cases the parties will not hear from the EEOC
for another 3 to 6 months until the employer receives a
request for more information with a two-week deadline.
5.  Assuming the employer complies, the case now site
for another 6 months and then the EEOC issues a
decision.
6.  Thus, it takes the EEOC anywhere from 11 to 15
months to issue a finding of cause or no cause.
7.  If the EEOC issues a cause finding the EEOC at-
tempts to conciliate. This process takes less than one
month. If the EEOC finds no cause, the employee can
start the litigation process.
8.  In 2015, 16.7% of the charging parties did not get a
resolution on the merits. Of the remaining 83.3%, 15.6%
received benefits of some kind, and the remaining 67.7%
(those who went through the whole process) can file in
court eleven to fifteen months after complaining to the
EEOC.
9.  The litigation process takes anywhere from two to
eight years and is expensive and time consuming.174
An examination of the EEOC’s statistics provides a clear picture of
the EEOC’s investigation and conciliation processes’ inability to provide
justice. From 1997 to 2015, there were a total of 1,754,777 cases re-
solved. Of those resolutions, 1,182,041 reached the final stage and re-
sulted in a determination of cause (91,034) or no cause (1,091,007). As
stated above, the EEOC attempts to conciliate the cause findings – they
were successful 27,111 times, or in about 30% of the cases.175 In the
other 63,923 cause findings, the charging parties had to begin the litiga-
tion process. That is the same process that the 1,091,007 no cause charg-
174 Interview with Ilene W. Berman, Vice Chair, Taylor English Duma LLP (July 14,
2016); Interview with Gregg A. Gilman, Labor & Emp’t Practice Grp. Co-Chair, Davis &
Gilbert LLP (July 14, 2016); Interview with Paul E. Wagner, Shareholder, Stokes Wagner
ALC (July 14, 2016).
175 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ALL STATUTES FY 1997 – FY 2015 (2015),
https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm?renderforprint=1.
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ing parties also had to begin. Thus, in about 70% of the cause findings,
the charging party waits approximately one year just to have the right to
file a lawsuit. Waiting eleven to fifteen months to get a resolution would
barely be acceptable for people who are out of work and need their back
pay. The eleven to fifteen months, however, for the vast majority of peo-
ple, is just the beginning of the process.
Administratively closed cases also get “right to sue” letters. Since
these cases did not go through the entire determination process, it is
likely that the EEOC issued many of these letters in a shorter time frame
than the eleven- to fifteen-month timeframe – indeed, after 180 days, the
charging party can request a right to sue letter even if the EEOC has not
finished its investigation. Thus, of the 1,754,777 charges resolved in the
nineteen years available, only 262,867 (or about 15%) received bene-
fits.176 The remaining claimants waited at least six months, and more
likely eleven to fifteen months simply to have the ability to file a lawsuit.
As bad as the EEOC process is, litigation can be much worse. First,
it is expensive. The costs of litigation will almost always exceed $25,000
and can be double, triple, or even five times as much for filing fees,
deposition transcripts, experts, and other expenses.177 It also takes a lot
of attorney time. Many plaintiffs’ lawyers will, of course, take the case
on contingency and thus, will only take a fee if they win. These lawyers,
however, have to hedge their bet. They simply cannot work a case for
years, put in hundreds of hours, put forward real money for expenses,
and then allow the plaintiff to settle for back pay without fees, or worse,
walk away before resolution. To ensure that plaintiffs do not walk away,
most plaintiffs’ lawyers demand that the employees have “skin in the
game” by requiring a retainer of anywhere from $10,000 to $20,000.178
In addition to the cost, litigation is an arduous process. There are
numerous motions and other court appearances that the employee must
take time off to attend. Depositions are stressful and often demeaning.
The trial, if there is one, can go on for an extended time and is scheduled
at the convenience of the court—not the parties. Moreover, it is often
public and can damage the reputation of the employee, who in all likeli-
hood will be looking for, or has found, another job. Finally, it takes too
long a time to provide justice. In a study done by Theodore Eisenberg
and Elizabeth Hill, it took on average, 709 days from the filing of the
lawsuit until a verdict was reached.179 Adding on to the EEOC process, it
176 Id.
177 Interview with Ilene W. Berman, supra note 174; Interview with Gregg A. Gilman, R
supra note 174; Interview with Paul E. Wagner, supra note 174. R
178 Sherwyn et al., Saving the Baby, supra note 1, at 33. R
179 David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for
Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1573 (2005) [hereinafter Sherwyn et al., New
Path].
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takes approximately three years to get to verdict. Worse, if the employee
prevails, the employer can appeal and tie up the case for many more
years. Indeed, if one were designing a system to get rid of discrimination
and provide justice, it is at best unlikely, and more realistically, impossi-
ble, that anyone would advocate for the current system.
The final reason we contend that the agency and litigation model is
a failed system is that the costs and delays create a perverse incentive
that undermines good actors and benefits bad actors. The good actor em-
ployees who were discriminated against in B cases face years of delay
and ultimately expensive litigation in order to be made whole. Thus,
these employees, who need the money and do not have the time or re-
sources to pursue litigation, have strong incentives to accept nuisance
settlements even if their cases are strong. Indeed, many management
lawyers report that they have, in fact, settled numerous cases that they
would not recommend litigating for apologies and other non-monetary
damages.180 In addition, these same lawyers report that they have settled
what they perceive to be strong cases for a very small fraction of what
the case is worth. Thus, the current system forces plaintiffs with strong
cases to either walk away or accept a settlement that is not reflective of
what the case is worth, benefitting bad actor employers. Similarly, the
system benefits bad actor employees and hurts good actor employers.
The bad actor employee files a charge and knows that the cost of a posi-
tion statement, mediation, and other agency and litigation expenses will
almost always exceed $10,000 so that the employer has to make a deci-
sion — incur the expenses to prove a negative and have the costs of
litigation hanging over its head, or provide de facto severance for the
employees.181 Below, we provide a theoretical argument as to why we
believe that EEOC/litigation is a poor system for resolving disputes.
III. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO CONTEND THAT EMPLOYMENT
LITIGATION IS BAD FOR GOOD ACTORS AND GOOD FOR BAD
ACTORS
A. The Haves Still Come Out Ahead
The comparison to the reality of the agency and litigation process is
the only comparison scholars should be making when contemplating
whether, and to what extent, mandatory arbitration is the preferable
method for adjudicating employment rights disputes. We contend that
employment litigation is a poor forum for addressing most employment
180 Interview with Ilene W. Berman, supra note 174; Interview with Gregg A. Gilman,
supra note 174; Interview with Paul E. Wagner, supra note 174. Additionally, the authors each
have practiced employment law for years and have had this experience personally.
181 Sherwyn et al., Saving the Baby, supra note 1, at 98. R
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disputes. The lower the compensation earned by the employee, the less
likely it is that litigation would serve as a meaningful and legitimate
method for obtaining redress.182 Similarly, the more likely an employer
is to be a large, institutional repeat player in litigation, the more likely
that employer will be able to exploit the legal system to its advantage in
the short run, by avoiding paying damages owed in legitimate claims,
and in the long run, by selecting only the best cases to pursue in litiga-
tion, maximizing the development of employer-friendly precedent. This
is not a new idea. It is part of the set of ideas advanced in Marc Ga-
lanter’s famous 1974 article, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come out Ahead: Specu-
lations on the Limits of Legal Change.”183 Litigation is the optimal
forum for serving employers that wish to violate the rights of their em-
ployees and use the high barriers to entering the litigation system as a
shield insulating them from liability, particularly against claims of low-
income employees.
B. The Theoretical Framework for Dispute Resolution Fairness
The authors’ philosophical approach to dispute resolution for em-
ployment rights may differ from the approach of detractors of mandatory
arbitration. The authors’ primary goal is to increase the rate of harmoni-
zation of outcomes and objective truth with respect to violations of the
law. That is, our aim is to maximize the rate at which employees who are
actually wronged recover the damages to which they are entitled—not
less, not more. Simultaneously, we are interested in minimizing the rate
at which employers who have not violated the law are systematically
incentivized to pay employees to avoid the costs of defending baseless
claims. This could be characterized as a distributive justice focus. The
authors are primarily interested in fairness as a function of equitable out-
comes or awards.184 We therefore prioritize processes that are fair over
those that are unfair, but are more focused on de facto outcomes and the
likelihood of dispute resolution outcomes aligning with the objective
facts when determining whether an employee plaintiff is actually harmed
in violation of the law. Along these lines, we explicitly prefer a process
that permits access to an adjudicatory process over one that denies access
to a percentage of employees, especially if the employees that are denied
access are low-income earners. All else equal, these employees are more
likely to need redress if they are economically harmed by employers vio-
lating their statutory employment rights. This is perhaps in alignment
182 See Sherwyn et al., Saving the Baby, supra note 1, at 92 n.102. R
183 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95–160 (1974).
184 See, e.g., Robert Folger, Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of
‘Voice’ and Improvement on Experienced Inequity, 35 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 108 (1977).
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with Samuel Estreicher’s characterization of the litigation system as a
“Cadillac” available to a limited percentage of employees, as compared
to mandatory arbitration, which is like a “Saturn,” and thus more widely
available, even if it lacks the fancy bells and whistles of the Cadillac.185
We prefer systems of adjudication that impose significantly lower barri-
ers to entry, so that the employees earning the lowest possible pay are not
left without a means to resolve a dispute. Directing a truly wronged low-
wage earning employee to a courthouse, or to the EEOC, where the barri-
ers to entry are too costly or too remote respectively, is the same as
pointing to brick wall.
Secondly, and related to the first aim, the authors do not wish to
expand or contract the scope of damages awardable to wronged em-
ployee plaintiffs. If the law permits a recovery of X dollars when a finder
of fact finds Y facts occurred, we strongly prefer a system of rights adju-
dication that most closely awards the wronged employee X, not some
multiple or fraction of X. This follows from the distributive justice focus
described above. All else equal, an adjudicatory system of individual
workplace rights that over-compensates employees is not a harmless
model. Some could regard overcompensating wronged employees as a
way that the legal system penalizes and disincentives employers from
discriminating. This argument is an extension of the expressive function
of the law.186 Employers view exorbitant jury awards for violations of
Title VII (as an illustration), and then pay extra attention to avoid dis-
criminating against other employees in a protected class. For this to hap-
pen as wished, only the marginal incentivization gained for the
difference between the damages the employee should receive (X), and
what the jury over-awarded (X + .5X for instance) should be evaluated as
potentially increasing employer incentivization to avoid violating em-
ployees’ rights. The question is therefore whether the average premium
over-compensation awarded by juries to the employee (in this example,
.5X) incentivizes improved employer behavior above what the X would
have incentivized alone. This seems unlikely to produce the hypothesized
effect, particularly because lost time and attorneys-fees associated with
the action are fixed costs regardless of whether the jury awards X or
1.5X. Therefore, the marginal improvement in behavior associated with
overcompensation is likely not effective at changing the underlying be-
havior of employers who have already decided that discriminating is in
their best interest at the lower price point. Further, even if the marginal
185 Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563–64 (2001) (“A
properly designed arbitration system . . . can do a better job of delivering accessible justice for
average claimants than a litigation-based approach.”).
186 Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1650–51 (2000).
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incentive for employers did produce the hypothesized effect (on the sub-
population of employers willing to consciously render employment deci-
sions that violate the law), the marginal deterrent effect on employers
ought to be weighed against the policy of encouraging an incorrect appli-
cation of the law. All else equal, the authors would prefer a dispute reso-
lution system for workplace rights that correctly compensates employees,
and optimally incentivizes bad actor employers to avoid violating the
law.
Lastly, the authors are equally concerned with Type-I and Type-II
errors when adjudicating employment rights disputes. Type-I errors, or
“false positive” results, in the context of employment rights adjudication,
are those in which no violation of the law occurs, but the system of adju-
dication is nonetheless systematically more likely to reward an employee
plaintiff that alleges employer wrongdoing.187 Type-I errors are not lim-
ited to only adjudicated cases. Non-meritorious cases that settle because
the costs of defense exceed the costs of settlement are Type-I errors as
well; plaintiffs, and their lawyers, are rewarded for bringing frivolous
cases. Type-II errors, or “false negative” results, are those in which a
violation of the law occurs, but the system of adjudication is nonetheless
systematically less likely to reward an employee plaintiff that alleges em-
ployer wrongdoing. We include in Type-II errors “nuisance settlements”
of legitimate cases where the money exchanged undervalues the harm the
employee suffered.188 In Figure 1, Type-I errors are illustrated in the top
right box in each of the four two-by-two tables, and Type-II errors are
illustrated in the bottom-left box in each of these two-by-two tables.
187 Joseph L. Gastwirth, Statistical Issues Arising in Equal Employment Litigation, 36
JURIMETRICS J. 353, 368 (1996).
188 A nuisance settlement is a low-dollar figure settlement that the employer agrees to in
order to avoid the time and expense of litigation. Attorneys Berman, Gilman, and Wagner
report that they that have seen numerous cases that could have value settled for nuisance
amounts because of time and expenses of the system forced the employee to “give in.” Inter-
view with Ilene W. Berman, supra note 174; Interview with Gregg A. Gilman, supra note 174; R
Interview with Paul E. Wagner, supra note 174. R
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We equally weigh the sources of mismatching between violations of
the law and compensation for those violations (in the form of settlement
money or awards), and therefore regard an adjudicatory system of rights
that avoids both types as “better” than an adjudicatory system that does
not avoid either, or a system that incentivizes Type-I errors. We refer to
the view of Type-I errors as favorable in the employment context as the
“Robin Hood effect.” Some commentators may regard employers paying
out more money than they should to employee plaintiffs as positive, be-
cause it redistributes wealth from “greedy” corporate employers to indi-
viduals.189 Those in favor of redistribution assert that even if the specific
individual employee was not legitimately wronged by the employer as
alleged, this is a minimal problem if and when it occurs, because it is a
tolerable downside of a litigation system that tends to favor employ-
ers.190 Essentially, it levels an unlevel playing field.
We are not convinced that Type-I errors should be tolerated or de-
sired in employment litigation. We argue that there may be significant
undesirable social costs associated with the “Robin Hood effect” of
Type-I errors in employment litigation that detractors of mandatory arbi-
tration are underestimating, or not estimating at all. Specifically, Type-I
errors may incentivize unlawful discrimination in hiring. It is difficult to
189 See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Pri-
vate Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326 (2006).
190 See id. at 349–53.
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prove discrimination in hiring. Such cases make up a small percentage of
the total cases filed.191 For instance, it is extremely hard to prove that an
employer failed to hire someone because of his or her protected status.
Aside from problems with proof, it is also less likely that an employee
would observe discrimination at the hiring stage than at a later employ-
ment stage, such as promotion or termination. Because transaction costs
are high in litigation, high wage earning employees in protected catego-
ries are shielded by the availability of Type-I errors and the fear of the
“Robin Hood effect.” Employers may become wary of hiring individuals
in protected categories into higher-paying positions as a direct result of
this justifiable fear.
Detractors may respond by suggesting that Type-I errors do not oc-
cur with sufficient frequency to merit the response we suggest in this
Article. We think that Type-I errors occur frequently because of the
structural incentives for them in litigation for high-value claims. In the
end, this is an unaddressed empirical question.192 However, there are sys-
tematic structural differences between the two forums worth describing,
in order to illustrate the relative likelihoods of Type-I and Type-II errors
occurring.
For the sake of illustration, in Figure 1 we refer to amounts greater
than $100,000 as “high-value” claims, and amounts less than $10,000 as
“low-value” claims.193 In high value claims, in both litigation and arbi-
tration, when an employee actually suffers a wrong, he is likely to be
compensated for it—either through settlement or receipt of a favorable
award exceeding the costs paid to obtain the result. Perhaps litigation
over-compensates by redistribution, and we suggest above that this is
problematic also. But, even if one overlooks this, or prefers redistributive
private law sanctioning, the main difference between arbitration and liti-
gation of high-value claims is the greater structural likelihood of Type-I
errors in litigation. For instance, an employee who throws a chair at his
manager and is promptly fired, who makes $200,000 per year, and who
191 John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1027 (1991) (“[U]nder the current regime in
which firing cases vastly outweigh hiring cases, Title VII may generate a net disincentive for
employers to hire protected workers.”).
192 Both authors have had conversations with defense-side counsel and in-house counsel
about the extent to which they perceive that Type-I errors occur in litigation. All of these
individuals perceive that a high volume of the claims brought have a low likelihood of plaintiff
success on the merits, but are nonetheless brought as viable settle-able claims because of the
high costs of defense. Obviously, this is anecdotal evidence, and should be treated as such.
193 These are somewhat arbitrary amounts, derived from approximate high and low esti-
mates of costs of defending a motion to dismiss. The middle-ground between $10,000 and
$100,000 is purposely left unaccounted for. These numbers are placeholders for the real cut-
offs for the effects described, and could be empirically derived or theoretically modeled with
greater precision. This is not done here in the interest of pithiness.
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is able to overcome the low thresholds for satisfying the requirements of
a prima facie case of discrimination will be able to sue and propose set-
tling for slightly less than the employer would have to pay to defend the
baseless suit. This unwronged employee is likely to get compensated to
avoid the high costs of litigation. A bad actor employee wins, and a good
actor employer loses, perhaps dis-incentivizing this employer from hiring
future employees in the same protected class or other protected classes.
With arbitration in place, the costs of adjudicating the same dispute are
lower.194 The employer is less likely to settle, and the unwronged em-
ployee is more likely to receive no compensation. So, for higher value
claims, arbitration is a structurally superior forum compared to the realis-
tic version of litigation.195
Figure 1 also shows that arbitration is a superior forum for lower
value claims more likely brought by low wage earners. In both forums,
when plaintiff employees bring a baseless claim, they are unlikely to
recover. In litigation, low-dollar value claims with no merit have nothing
attractive about them to plaintiff-side lawyers, and they are therefore be-
low the cost threshold, making it worthwhile to take on the case. In arbi-
tration, it may actually cost more to bat away baseless low-dollar value
claims. This is because arbitrating a baseless claim costs more than turn-
ing away a baseless claim in a plaintiffs’ lawyer’s office. Additionally,
claims with low-dollar values are more likely to be brought in arbitration
than in litigation.196 For employees with legitimate low-dollar value
claims of discrimination, in litigation, plaintiffs’ lawyers are unlikely to
represent this person, and the EEOC is unlikely to step in. In arbitration,
however, the simplicity of the forum, and the fact that most arbitration
policies provide that the employer will not bring counsel if the employee
does not, allow plaintiffs to represent themselves pro se. These employ-
ees get “their day,” regardless of merit. Moreover, plaintiffs’ lawyers
who seek to legitimately represent aggrieved employees should be satis-
fied with getting their hourly rate if they prevail, because the time and
expense to arbitrate a case is low enough that an hourly rate for victory is
194 See Sherwyn et al., New Path, supra note 179, at 1560. R
195 An additional related benefit of arbitration as compared to litigation is the reduced
incentive for plaintiff-side employment lawyers to recast non-meritorious, but highly valued,
claims into claims of discrimination to leverage settlement. In litigation, if the chair-throwing
employee comes to a lawyer and says that he was treated unfairly, but not because of his
membership in a protected class, a lawyer may be incentivized to recast the claim of unfair
treatment as discriminatory.
196 According to Senior Counsel for Labor and Employment at General Electric, Bobby
Simpson, who administers GE’s multi-step ADR program which culminates in binding arbitra-
tion, a serious risk of mandatory arbitration is that meritorious and frivolous claims get equal
treatment, and that less screening results in more arbitration of claims that would have other-
wise been dismissed on a motion in litigation, or not even sufficiently formed the basis of a
complaint.
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not the unreasonable risk it is in litigation, which can take two to ten
years and cost tens of thousands of dollars in expenses.197
Because the likelihood of Type-II errors is significantly worse in
litigation than in arbitration, it seems likely that the structural arguments
favor arbitration. Despite the logic of supporting arbitration as preferred
method for employees, the bulk of academic work attacks arbitration
and, therefore implicitly, supports the agency/litigation model. To sup-
port their arguments, scholars rely on empirical studies that are, we con-
tend, flawed.
IV. THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Over the last twenty years, most scholars interested in workplace
dispute resolution have attacked arbitration.198 First, in the early years
after Gilmer, critics asserted that arbitration policies were unfair to em-
ployees because of structural biases such as reduction of damages, lack
of mutual selection of arbitrators, and other procedurally flawed compo-
nents of employment policies.199 Next, critics made a macro argument
that arbitration prevents the development of the law because of private,
non-precedential decision rendering.200 Finally, critics contended that ar-
bitration is unfair to employees because it robs them of their right to a
trial in order to be employed,201 that arbitrators are more likely to side
with employers than employees because employers are “repeat play-
197 See generally Sherwyn et. al., New Path, supra note 179, at 1579. R
198 See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1247, 1247, 1254 (2009) (explaining that there are three types of “fairness” concerns
in the debate over mandatory arbitration clauses: process, outcome, and access); Alexander
J.S. Colvin, Employment Arbitration: Empirical Findings and Research Needs, 64-OCT DISP.
RESOL. J. 6, 6 (2009) (“There is vociferous opposition to employers forcing pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements on employees.”). There are three types of “fairness” concerns in the debate
over mandatory arbitration clauses: process, outcome, and access. Id. at 1254; see also Scott
Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV. 861, 891 n.2 (2004)
(providing a non-exhaustive list of works critiquing mandatory arbitration).
199 See generally Schwartz, supra note 198, at 1254–57. R
200 See, e.g., U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Policy Statement on
Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of
Employment pt. V(A)(2) (EEOC Notice No. 915.002) (July 10, 1997); see also Harry T. Ed-
wards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employ-
ment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293, 296 (1999) (arguing that a decrease in published judicial
opinions could negatively affect the development of the legal doctrine).
201 See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 406, 406 n.3 (2007)
[hereinafter Colvin, Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury] (citing Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the
1990s, 73 DEN. U. L. REV. 1017, 1019–20 (1996) (arguing that mandatory arbitration clauses
in hiring agreements raise due process concerns because employees “lack bargaining power
and are needful of employment”)).
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ers,”202 and that arbitrators award lower damages to employees than
juries.203
The first two arguments quickly lost luster. First, both courts and
the arbitration community established protocols for procedural fair-
ness,204 and thus, the early and somewhat outrageous policies that, for
example, limited damages or had a company manager as the arbitrator,
are not enforceable in any court. The “development of the law” argument
fails because the current system is designed specifically to not develop
the law. As stated above, the EEOC resolves close to 100,000 per cases
per year.205 State agencies resolve a similar number. Despite nearly
200,000 cases resolved each year, there are only approximately 20,000
cases fielded in federal court each year. Of those 20,000 cases, fewer
than 10% are resolved by trial or dispositive motion. It is difficult to
criticize arbitration, which issues written opinions, for failing to develop
the law, when the vast majority of EEOC charges are resolved privately
with no precedential effect.206 It is even more problematic to force
200,000 claimants per year to endure an inefficient and ineffective sys-
tem so that less than 1% of the cases will have the potential to “make
new law.” The next and ongoing wave of anti-arbitration scholarship
purports to be supported by empirical studies. Below, we examine these
studies and contend that they do not support litigation over arbitration
and in fact, arbitration compares very favorably.
The empirical studies may be divided into three categories: (1) those
that compare plaintiff loss rates in arbitration to litigation; (2) those that
compare damage awards in arbitration to litigation; and (3) those that
analyze arbitration as a forum compared to hypothetical base rates of
information, such as how frequently an employer should win discrimina-
tion cases or other metrics.207 In the third category, scholars compare
202 See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223,
238-39 (1998) (finding that employees arbitrating against a repeat-player lose more frequently)
[hereinafter Bingham, On Repeat Players].
203 Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 199–200 (1997) (showing evidence that awards may be lower in arbitration
than in litigation) [hereinafter Bingham, Repeat Player Effect].
204 See generally Comm’n on the Future of Worker-Mgmt. Relations, The Dunlop Com-
mission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations: Final Report (Dep’t of Labor 1994).
For further discussion on due process protocols in the arbitration field, see Bingham, On Re-
peat Players, supra note 202, at 229–31. R
205 See Comm’n on the Future of Worker-Mgmt. Relations, supra note 204, at 50. R
206 See Administrative Enforcement and Litigation, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/en
forcement_litigation.cfm (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (stating that the Commission often re-
solves charges through “conciliation or other informal methods”).
207 See generally Sherwyn et al., New Path, supra note 179, at 1567–76 (citing Theodore R
Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical Compari-
son (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Paper Series, Research Paper No.
65, 2003); Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbi-
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arbitration results of employers who are “repeat players” (i.e. employers
who have more than one arbitration) and repeat players with the same
arbitrator to results from so-called single player employers and employ-
ers who are before an arbitrator for the first time.208 As described in
more detail below, the findings from these studies either lend no support
to the argument that arbitrators unfairly decide cases or, in some cases,
they unwittingly lend support for mandatory arbitration as a forum that
augments access for those who would not otherwise be able to bring their
claims without mandatory arbitration in place.
The first and most important argument that undermines the empiri-
cal studies of arbitration as compared to litigation is the lack of salient
base rate information on expected win rates. We do not know how many
cases that make it to adjudication have merit. If 90% have merit, then the
forum with results closest to a 90% employee win rate is the most just. If
10% have merit, then that is the employee win rate a just forum should
yield. Assuming that a just forum would yield a 50% win-rate for em-
ployees is simplistic and unrealistic. This assumption fails to account for
asymmetric information availability about the validity of cases. Employ-
ers settle cases with bad facts at early stages. Another indication of ex-
pected rates of meritorious claims is the EEOC’s classifications of merit
and non-merit resolutions. All settlements, even nuisance settlements of
$100, are classified as merit resolutions. As stated above, in the last fif-
teen years the EEOC classified at least 80%, and some years as much as
90%, as being non-merit resolutions. Should the EEOC non-merit resolu-
tions be the baseline? In other words, should employers prevail in over
80% of the cases?
Along these same lines, scholars compare damages awards. Again,
there is no baseline. Are damage demands a fiction set forth by a plain-
tiffs’ lawyer trying to increase the cases’ value or a legitimate calculation
of back pay? Is back pay reduced in arbitration because of the speed of
the process? Do juries award punitive damages regardless of the law’s
requirements that the conduct be reckless or malicious as well as inten-
tional? Do reported jury verdicts include damage awards that surpass the
statutory punitive limit of $300,000 because juries are not told about
such limits? Of course, judges automatically remit these awards, a step
tration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. DISP.
RESOL. 777 (2003); Estreicher, supra note 185, at 1569; Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: R
Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998); Bingham,
Repeat Player Effect, supra note 203; William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment R
Discrimination: What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, DISP. RESOL. J.,
Oct.–Dec. 1995, at 40.
208 See Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 202, at 223, 237; see also Sherwyn et. R
al., New Path, supra note 179, at 1570–72 (discussing Lisa Bingham’s empirical study on the R
effects of repeat-players on arbitration results).
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that is not necessary because arbitrators are aware of these limits. What
percentage of “good cases” do the EEOC and dispute resolution steps
weed out? Do only higher award cases make it to court? While certain
scholars do attempt to examine some of these questions, the data simply
does not provide enough answers to make a real comparison.
Finally, and most importantly, the comparisons are taking different
cases and implying that the forum dictates results. Having one case adju-
dicated in arbitration and one in litigation does not tell us the legitimacy
of the forums. Neither does having 1,000 cases in each forum. These are
different cases, under different laws, with different cost structures, differ-
ent barriers to entry, and different time frames. At the end of the day, all
we can tell from these descriptive statistics is what the means and medi-
ans are with respect to win/loss rates, time, damages, costs, and fees.
These means and medians do not inform us of justice. In fact, the only
means and medians that provide any useful information are those associ-
ated with time and costs. While it is possible that the cases litigated are
more complex than those arbitrated, and that is why time and fees are
longer and higher, the fact that arbitration features less discovery, fewer
motions, and no year-long EEOC wait allows us to infer that arbitration
is faster and less expensive.
Cases that are litigated are filed with the EEOC or state agencies
before going to court. Arbitration cases are not. It is our understanding of
existing empirical work that the percentage of litigated cases deemed
meritorious by the EEOC that nonetheless lose in court is not reported.
However, the whole bundle of arbitration cases is compared to litigation
results to conclude that arbitration is unfair. This obvious thumb on the
scale weighting is not a useful exercise from which to draw this
conclusion.
There are two basic selection effect problems that plague empirical
comparisons of arbitration to litigation. First is the existence of structural
differences between arbitration and litigation such as motion practices.
Most arbitration policies do not allow for motions to dismiss or summary
judgment motions.209 These dispositive motions eliminate a huge per-
centage of meritless cases from the litigation process.210 So, the universe
of arbitration cases includes more cases in which employees should lose
209 See Sherwyn et. al., New Path, supra note 179, at 1569 (discussing how including R
“[a]rbitration cases that could have been decided by motion, had the matter been in litigation
rather than arbitration” in the data lowers employee win rates).
210 See Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis
of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 681,
694 tbls. 2.A & 2.B; see also Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Scaling the Pyramid: A
Sociolegal Model of Employment Discrimination Litigation, HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION RESEARCH 1, 3–34 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2008).
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because they are not screened out in motions.211 Second, the cost of
bringing a complaint in arbitration is much lower than the cost of bring-
ing a complaint in court.212 So, holding constant the merits of a claim, a
plaintiff is more likely to bring his claim to arbitration compared to liti-
gation. Again, more claims with weaker facts supporting plaintiffs’
cases, and lower-value claims will be systematically more prevalent in
the pool of arbitration cases relative to the pool of litigated cases. Ra-
tional plaintiffs’ lawyers do not, and should not, risk their time on cases
with a low probability of success. Lawyers may take cases with weaker
merits in an arbitration forum. We do not have any direct evidence that
this is the case. We do, however, believe that arbitration is friendlier to
pro se employees, based on our personal experiences with employers
who have implemented mandatory arbitration. Employers such as
Darden Restaurants, General Electric, and Halliburton will not have a
lawyer arbitrate the case if the employee is pro se and/or have an em-
ployee benefit plan whereby the employee selects an attorney and the
company pays for all or a portion of the fees. We know of no employer
that will not use an attorney if the employee is pro se nor do we know
any employer that helps defray litigation costs and fees for its employees.
Thus, it stands to reason that more marginal, or even meritless cases,
make it into the arbitration process compared to litigation, because arbi-
tration cases do not have to survive both dispositive motions and rational
plaintiffs’ lawyers case acceptance standards.
These problems could be corrected if the adjudicative forum were
randomly assigned. It is our understanding that none of the studies pur-
porting to demonstrate that mandatory arbitration is “worse” than litiga-
tion employs such a design.213
The next set of empirical research compares specific arbitration re-
sults to more general arbitration results. This scholarship examines the
win/loss records of plaintiffs in arbitrations where the employer is a re-
peat player versus those where the employer is not a repeat player.214
These scholars define repeat players as employers who have had one
more than one arbitration in the applicable data set.215 The double repeat
211 See supra note 81. R
212 See Sherwyn et al., Saving the Baby, supra note 1, at 100 (stating that arbitration is R
less expensive than litigation partly because lawyers do not need to spend as much time to
arbitrate as they would to litigate a court case); see also Sherwyn et al., New Path, supra note
179, at 1574–76 (generally comparing costs of arbitration and litigation). R
213 See Sherwyn et al., New Path, supra note 179, at 1565, 1567 (providng a list of R
sources).
214 See Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 202; Bingham, Repeat Player Effect, R
supra note 203. R
215 See generally Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 202; Bingham, Repeat Player R
Effect, supra note 203 (using “repeat player” most commonly to refer to employers who have R
had more than one arbitration in an applicable data set).
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player not only has arbitrated before, it has arbitrated before the same
arbitrator.216 The reported findings of these studies are that repeat players
may prevail more than non-repeat players (statistically significant) and
double repeat players are more successful than repeat players (but not
statically significant).217 The conclusion either implicitly or expressly
stated is that arbitrators may favor the employer who can hire them in the
future and, even more so, who hired them in the past.218
These studies do not demonstrate arbitrator bias, nor do they sug-
gest that mandatory arbitration presents a forum likely to yield worse
results for employees. First, repeat players are labeled repeat players
when their second case is in the data set.219 Researchers include the first
case in the repeat players’ win/loss record.220 This placement begs the
question: how did the arbitrator in the first case know the employer
would be a repeat player? The answer provides a plausible reason to
explain the repeat and double repeat player effects – repeat players are,
in most cases, employers with arbitration policies affecting most of, if
not the entire workforce. These employers are not only arbitrating one
off “for cause” employment contracts with senior executives. Instead,
they are arbitrating civil rights claims for their entire workforce.221 Such
arbitrations are not, however, the first step in the process. Instead, every
mandatory arbitration policy the authors have reviewed contains a multi-
ple-step grievance procedure that includes some form of mediation or
peer review adjudication process.222 Thus, the parties have, in many
216 Colvin refers to this “double repeat player” effect as the “repeat employer-arbitrator”
effect. Colvin, supra note 201, at 430; see Sherwyn et al., New Path, supra note 179, at 1571, R
1571 n.64 (citing Lisa Bingham’s study in which she analyzed “repeat player” and “repeat
arbitrator” cases and citing Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before
and After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Aris-
ing out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence That Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in
PROCEEDING OF THE NYU 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303, 323 tbl.2 (Samuel
Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004)).
217 Bingham, Repeat Player Effect, supra note 203, at 213 (finding that “[e]mployees R
dealing with non-repeat player employers recovered on average 48% of what they demanded,
while employees dealing with repeat player employers recovered only 11% of what they de-
manded”). See generally Colvin, supra note 201, at 430 (“Out of the same sample of 836
awards, employees won only fourteen out of the 124 cases (11.3 percent) involving a repeat
employer-arbitrator pair, compared to 151 out of the 712 cases (21.2 percent) that did not
involve a repeat employer-arbitrator pair, which was a statistically significant
difference . . . .”).
218 Colvin, supra note 201, at 427.
219 See id. at 427–31.
220 Id.
221 See Sherwyn et al., New Path, supra note 201, at 1570. One reason for finding that
employees won less against repeat players was that “repeat players were arbitrating under an
arbitration policy where employees were employed at will and had to prove that the employer
violated state or federal law.” Id.
222 Colvin, supra note 201, at 11 (“Case studies of companies that have adopted internal
grievance procedures, such as internal management appeals boards, mediation, or peer review,
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cases, a non-adversarial, process that will allow for settlements or other
type of resolution. Following a multi-step grievance process, an em-
ployer should never arbitrate a case it can lose. Thus, employers that
have so many arbitrations that they are repeat and, in some case, maybe
double repeat players, should have significantly better win records than
non-repeat players. Similarly, experienced employers should have better
win/loss records than inexperienced employers in litigation and before
the EEOC.
Employers learn from their experiences. If an arbitrator at time 1
with plaintiff 1 expresses that she would be convinced that no discrimi-
nation occurred if the employer can produce X type of evidence, the
employer is more likely to pay attention to X type of evidence in present-
ing its case before the same arbitrator in the future. Similarly, it stands to
reason that repeat player litigators know what judges are looking for in
summary judgment motions and what juries rely on at trials. Do repeat
player litigators fair better than non-repeat litigators? We contend that
the proper comparison for repeat player employers in arbitration is repeat
player employers in litigation. We know of such studies. It is, however,
the authors’ own experiences as practitioners that repeat players who
know how to respond to the EEOC do better than those accused for the
first time. In fact, we modestly, and sadly report, that our firms’ and our
experienced clients’ knowledge of how “to play the EEOC game” al-
lowed us to resolve claims of “guilty employers” with findings of no
cause or of nuisance settlements. We further contend that we could never
have attained such a result in front of any AAA, JAMS, or any other
legitimate arbitrator. The authors of the repeat player studies do not even
contemplate such a comparison.223 Instead, arbitration is pitted against,
as we stated above, utopian litigation.
The easiest (and most plausible) explanation of why many “repeat
player” employers win more often is that they should win more. Another
name for “repeat players” that prevail in cases frequently could be
“good/realistic employers” who tend not to violate the law and when the
facts are bad, their experienced, risk averse lawyers, settle. Assuming
that lower transactional costs for bringing cases increases the volume of
meritless (and more questionable, but possibly meritorious) cases
brought against employers with arbitration agreements in place, good/
realistic employers would nonetheless face a higher volume of claims,
which, they would win when arbitrated. Good/realistic employers should
win more claims. Evidence that the arbitrator ruled in favor of an em-
ployer at time 1 with plaintiff 1 could be interpreted as the correct result,
along with employment arbitration suggest that they can resolve many cases, with potential
advantages from both the employees and the organization’s point of view.”).
223 See, e.g., Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 202; Colvin, supra note 201. R
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which means that all else equal, perhaps this employer does a good job of
complying with the law and settles when it does not. So, with plaintiff 2
at time 2, one would expect the same result. The repeat player effect is
more appropriately interpreted as evidence that arbitration is working—it
is permitting employees with weaker or meritless claims their opportu-
nity for “voice” and correctly sorting out the bad claims that we don’t
observe in litigation because they are likely screened out by plaintiff-side
lawyers or in motion practice. Even if one erroneously believes that em-
ployers are only more likely to have a time-2 or plaintiff-2 if they behave
illegally, the conclusion that arbitrators are biased against employers
based on the repeat player data is incorrect because one cannot (and
should not) rule out the possibility that arbitrators are getting it right in
their rulings because repeat players should win more often, and we do
not observe non-repeat player win rates to compare.
Professor Alex Colvin studied 449 arbitration cases.224 Cases adju-
dicated in arbitration had almost identical means and medians – 367
days. Professor Colvin also provides the mean and median awards for
those employer-promulgated policies versus individual negotiated con-
tracts. The value of such comparisons is limited at best. For example,
Colvin reports that the win rate for individual contracts is 64.6% versus
24.7% for employer-promulgated policies. He hypothesizes that the dif-
ference may be explained by increased sophistication, access to better
counsel or the fact that contractual claims are easier to prevail on than
statutory claims. At first blush, reason three seems the most persuasive –
in employment cases employers have the burden of proving just cause
and employees have to prove discrimination. Clearly, it is much more
difficult to prove just cause than to prevent an employee from proving
discrimination. As stated above, employers who are sophisticated enough
to have a company-wide arbitration policy are competent enough to eval-
uate cases and avoid the smoking gun often needed to prove discrimina-
tion. Moreover, not paying an employee their contractually required
damages is limited to the amount owed – there are not attorneys’ fees,
costs, or punitive damages. A high damage award and limited extra costs
could incentivize employers to refuse to pay the demanded amount and
force the employee to arbitrate. In addition, the definition of cause can
result in good faith disputes (e.g. did having a consensual affair with a
paid intern violate the moral turpitude clause; is poor performance in the
great recession cause). Losing a good faith dispute does not create the
friction costs of being labeled a discriminator, thus, the risk of arbitrating
is reduced. On the employee side, those with individual contracts are
almost always high-wage earners who either can, or must, not get a new
224 Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employ-
ment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP’T & LAB. L. 71 (2014).
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job right away, and they have the means to pursue their cases. This
makes a settlement less likely. In other words, comparing the results of
employer-promulgated policies versus individual contracts proves one
thing – these cases are different and there is no useful comparison be-
tween the two.
Putting it all together, Colvin finds that many of the claims from
employer-promulgated policies are for high wage earners who have at-
torneys. He also finds that motion practice is on the rise and settlements
resolve the majority of cases. Colvin, a long-time critic of arbitration,
seemingly dismisses one of the benefits of arbitration by stating the typi-
cal time of arbitration, one year, is only a year shorter than typical litiga-
tion—a 100% difference. Of course, left out of this comparison is the
fact that typical litigation often begins after anywhere from six months to
two years of EEOC time prior to trial and can include years of appeals
after. He then states there are lower win rates in arbitration than litiga-
tion—a statement that even if true (and it can be disputed), it is at best,
superficial, and more likely in reality, an irrelevant statement. He then
concludes that his results call in to question arbitration’s claim of provid-
ing access to justice for low-wage workers because, while not as bad as
litigation, it’s too much like litigation.
Colvin’s conclusion brings one back to the great debates over labor
arbitration by Derek Bok and Archibald Cox—should arbitration be
more or less legal?225 It may be better if arbitration were less legal, but
unlike those labor arbitration debates, we are dealing with statutory
rights and high damage awards. Thus, the legend that great labor leaders
could hear a piece of an arbitration argument and then make off the cuff
decisions is less appealing. Assuming arbitration is, however, “too le-
gal,” it is still much less problematic than the agency and litigation pro-
cess. With employer-promulgated policies, the facts are that arbitration:
(1) is significantly faster; (2) is easier for, and has more, pro se plaintiffs;
(3) almost always includes in-house dispute resolution programs that re-
solve cases in less adversarial method; and (4) according to the Stanford
article,226 results in the vast majority of claimants remaining employed.
The goal of the employment adjudication system is to eliminate discrimi-
nation in the workplace and to ensure that employers comply with appli-
cable labor and employment laws. Instead of trying to shoehorn
225 See Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964); Archibald Cox & John
Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63
HARV. L. REV. 389 (1950); Archibald Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L.
REV. 574 (1951); Archibald Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV.
(1954); Archibald Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARV. L. REV. 591
(1954); Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1959).
226 See Sherwyn et al., New Path, supra note 179, at 1589. R
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employment disputes into an overloaded court system with rules that are
not designed for the everyday interactions that result in workplace dis-
putes, we suggest continued focus on development of fair and neutral
arbitration based systems that address legitimate concerns with privatized
employment dispute resolution.
While we conclude that that arbitration is better than the alternative
agency and litigation process, we also accept that arbitration is far from
perfect. We contend, however that makes more sense to improve private
ADR systems which, instead of trying to eliminate this superior, but
flawed, system in favor of the agency and litigation process — an awful
system that cannot be fixed
V. THE REMEDY
Arbitration is not a panacea. However, even in its partially unregu-
lated form, it is still better than litigation if the operative measure of
success is justifiable and fair outcomes for employers and employees.
Litigation’s woes are less likely surmountable than arbitration. There-
fore, we suggest working on overcoming mandatory arbitration’s faults
in as meaningful a way as possible.
Litigation is a poor system for fairly addressing employment
disputes.
Attempts to make litigation more employment dispute friendly will
likely have negative effects on other areas of the law. It would involve
restructuring a system that pre-dates the Constitution, is provided for in
the Constitution, and is so vast that it is simply beyond comprehension.
Mandatory arbitration of employment disputes, however, can be system-
atically revamped in a meaningful way that improves outcomes and
processes for claimants and increases the odds of producing just results.
In order to begin to address the concerns over arbitration, there must
be both new legislation, and administrative agencies to enforce and im-
plement those laws. While proposing legislation in the current political
environment often seems comical, that cannot compel scholars and advo-
cates to refrain from thoughtful creativity in favor of a seriously flawed
status quo. Before we provide our solutions, we need to identify the
problems.
We split the “problems” with arbitration into three categories: (1)
protocol problems; (2) real, or imaginary, arbitrator neutrality problems;
and (3) structural problems. Below we quickly identify the problems
with arbitration and then provide the fix.
A. Due Process
As stated above, for years, anti-arbitration scholars argue that arbi-
tration policies are unfair despite the fact that most, if not all of these
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problems have been resolved.227 It is interesting because almost all arbi-
tration policies, like union grievance procedures, provide parties with
several steps to discuss and resolve issues before they reach arbitration.
Indeed, in our 2004 study of a large employer with a mature ADR/arbi-
tration policy, less than 10% of the cases went to arbitration, more than
90% of the claims were resolved in one week or less, and more than 90%
of the employees remained employed.228 Not surprisingly, arbitration
critics ignore or downplay the benefits of ADR inherent in most policies
and focus on the unfairness of rogue policies. Indeed, there have been
policies, some of which were upheld by courts, that limited awardable
damages, provide for unilateral selection of the arbitrator by the em-
ployer, or contain other untenable procedures. Those who attacked these
policies were correct and the courts have responded by declaring those
arbitration policies as unenforceable.
While it is clear that for the most part, protocol problems have been
fixed. Legislation could easily solve all protocol concerns by simply fol-
lowing the due process “protocol” and the several court opinions requir-
ing that arbitration policies provide for the following: (1) written
opinions, (2) choice of arbitrator through the AAA, JAMS, or another
approved agency; (3) defined discovery;229 (4) statutory damages; (5)
defined expenses230; and (6) clear communication of the policy so that
employees are aware of the policy, understand how it operates, and have
access to its adjudication process. This could be achieved by requiring
that the policy be in a stand-alone document that employees have ade-
quate time to read and understand.231 Arbitration policies that failed to
satisfy the Mandatory Arbitration Act’s protocol would be
unenforceable.
227 See Comm’n on the Future of Worker-Mgmt. Relations, supra note 204; see also On R
Repeat Players, supra note 202 and accompanying text. R
228 See Sherwyn et al., New Path, supra note 179, at 1587–89. R
229 By defined discovery, we mean a set number of depositions, document requests, inter-
rogatories, and a process for requesting more discovery if necessary.
230 There is debate over arbitration expenses. Some contend employers should pay all
while others contend this would unduly influence arbitrators. In limited space we cannot fully
address the debate other than to say the options are not vast, the problems not unique, and a
solution can be found.
231 Of course, some may argue that the policy should be post-dispute voluntary. This
defeats the purpose, as when a claim is ripe it is at best impractical, and more likely, impossi-
ble to find a situation where the employer and the employee would each choose arbitration.
Instead, one side will almost always find strategic advantages in the inefficiencies of litigation.
Similarly, pre-dispute voluntary arbitration policies simply provide an opt-out which very few
employees invoke, so there is no real point. While there may be other protocol concerns that
we did not mention, none of the issues that we have seen cannot be resolved.
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B. Arbitrator Neutrality
The arbitrator neutrality concerns are not easily identified and there-
fore are not simple to fix. As stated above, the main theory behind arbi-
trator neutrality issues is the concern that arbitrators will rule in favor of
employers because employers will be repeat players and therefore re-
present future work for arbitrators. Above, we contested these conclu-
sions. That said, perception is reality and this issue can be resolved.
The obvious answer is that the plaintiffs’ bar will be repeat players
too and thus, like a union, level the playing field. The arbitration critics
claim this is not the case and hypothesize that arbitration employees have
trouble getting counsel. This should not be the case. Because arbitration
is faster and less expensive, plaintiffs’ lawyers should prefer it over liti-
gation. As far as we know there have been no studies showing that it is
easier, or more difficult, for plaintiffs to find counsel in litigation as com-
pared to arbitration. Indeed, Colvin criticizes arbitration because too
many claimants have counsel (kind of an arguing both sides). Instead, as
stated above, there are studies that show that plaintiffs’ lawyers will re-
fuse to take low wage cases and insist on large retainers for all but the
strongest cases. If plaintiffs’ lawyers will not take arbitration cases, there
is a question that needs to addressed: do plaintiffs’ lawyers only take
high damage cases where they can use the costs of litigation to force a
settlement, independent of the merits of the claims? If so, should we
perpetuate such a system? Even if this is the case, we live in the informa-
tion age. When one of the authors began practicing, he vetted arbitrators
by accessing loose-leaf notebooks in law libraries that may or may not
have had any information on the arbitrators selected in a panel. The in-
ternet has rectified this problem. Any lawyer and most employees can
research arbitrators and view their prior awards. In any event, lawyers
can contact arbitrators and gain additional information on their history of
awards. But even more can be done if this is not sufficiently convincing.
First, we can develop a sophisticated “TripAdvisor”-like232 arbitra-
tor rating system based on data analytics. The system, which the Cornell
Institute for Hospitality Labor & Employment Relations (CIHLER)
would be willing to establish and administer, would provide reviews for
arbitrators and allow employees to obtain relevant unbiased information
that would seriously hamper any actual repeat player effects—if they
exist. Second, the EEOC or the Department of Labor (DOL) can assign
investigators or lawyers to guide employees and their counsel through
the arbitration selection process. While choosing an arbitrator takes time,
it does not take nearly the amount of time that investigating a case does.
232 TripAdvisor is a popular consumer review website for travel-related content, such as
hotels and tours. See TRIPADVISOR, https://www.tripadvisor.com/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2016).
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EEOC and DOL resources would be well used as part of the selection
process. Having the EEOC and DOL choose the arbitrator on behalf of
the plaintiff would clearly level the playing field and end the repeat
player debate.
C. The Development of the Law
An arbitration entity needs to need to publish arbitration awards.
Currently, the redacted awards are available on Lexis. They are not avail-
able for free on the internet and they are somewhat difficult to access for
the pro se inexperienced employees. Again, there is an easy fix. CIHLER
is working to create a publicly available database of arbitration awards.
We would be the depository of all arbitration awards, would redact the
parties’ names, and then would post them online. To make matters easier,
CIHLER would create an index system so that employees and employers
could easily research the relevant topic. CIHLER would also publish a
yearly report on arbitration’s development of the law. If the EEOC deter-
mined that arbitrators were “getting something wrong” (e.g. liability in
sexual harassment cases or not applying the law regarding sexual stereo-
types to transgender employees), or if it was not developing the law to
the EEOC (e.g. religious accommodation), the EEOC could label such
cases as A’s and litigate them.
D. Class Actions
The most challenging arbitration issue concerns class actions. As we
contend above, class actions benefit lawyers more than anyone else and
are often not the best way to resolve systemic workplace disputes. The
fact is that there are cases when it is best for the employees and society
to have cases litigated by a class. The answer is somewhat simple—let
the government litigate class actions. Before any case is resolved by arbi-
tration, the EEOC and DOL class action development of law departments
should review the facts and circumstances. If the appropriate government
agency believes the case merits intervention, then the Agency can take
the case on behalf of the employees. Even their harshest critics believe,
as we clearly do, that the EEOC and DOL are effective litigants. In fact,
as one prominent management lawyer stated with regard to an agency
charge: “If the EEOC brings the lawsuit against your client—God help
you.”233 It is hypocritical to argue that the EEOC and the DOL cannot be
trusted to select arbitrators or choose to litigate cases, but is perfectly
competent to investigate and resolve all claims. The argument of limited
resources is undermined by the fact that mass arbitration will greatly re-
233 The attorney, a partner at a major NYC labor and employment firm, stated this at the
Tenth Annual Labor and Employment Law Roundtable at Cornell University, May 4, 2009.
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duce the amount of time needed to investigate claims and the resources
can be redirected. Redirecting the majority of cases to arbitration will
free up resources at the EEOC and DOL to allow the Agencies to do
what they do best—litigate class actions and other cases that should be in
the courts for the public good.
E. The Mandatory Arbitration Act (the MAA)
The MAA, in its simplest form, would require:
1.  Due Process Protocol as determined by statue;
2.  A system for rating arbitrators administered by
Cornell;
3.  The EEOC/DOL to act as an advisor for employees
seeking help with selecting an arbitrator;
4.  That all policies expressly state that employees have
the right to file with the EEOC/DOL and/or any other
federal, state, or local agency. That agency would have
thirty to forty-five days to decide to take the plaintiff and
litigate the case on behalf of the employee. The Agency
would have the right to file class actions; and
5.  All other case would be deferred to arbitration.
CONCLUSION
The current system provides justice for a few, a windfall for some,
and frustration and defeat for most. A system that is predicated on mak-
ing those 1%, 2%, - 5% , that have suffered egregious harm, whole at the
expense of the remaining 90% are either left of, or abused by, the process
is not justice. Arbitration can provide justice!
The current agency and litigation model is awful for employees,
especially low-wage earners. While the EEOC could change its process,
there is no way to fix litigation. Instead of trying to destroy arbitration
(and by extension perpetuate the current system), employee advocates
and scholars should try to solve arbitrations problems while saving em-
ployees from litigation—a system that no honest employee, employee
advocate, or scholar would ever propose or champion.
Essential to the authors’ argument is that both Type-I and Type-II
errors in employment dispute resolution should be equally weighted, and
thus, equally avoided. Another part of the argument is that compared to
the status quo of litigation, arbitration is a better system for avoiding
both types of errors, and maximizing fair adjudication of employment
disputes. In spite of the arguments in favor of mandatory arbitration, mo-
mentum has gained against it in the past two decades. It is generally hard
to reverse momentum. Reversing academic momentum is no exception.
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The momentum against mandatory arbitration was born of flawed inter-
pretations of empirical studies and unfair comparisons to an unrealistic
utopia of litigation. Imagine a world in which there were no system in
place resolving employment disputes. If Congress convened experts and
academics, we believe it is unlikely that the consensus would be to create
a system as flawed as the current system of litigation as a way of effec-
tively and fairly addressing workplace rights disputes. The most likely
result would be a forum of small tribunals of workplace-focused dispute
resolution similar to models in Europe.234
Imagine instead, that the default way of resolving disputes were
mandatory arbitration. If all disputes were resolved this way, bad actor
employers would likely vigorously lobby for litigation to replace arbitra-
tion as the default way of resolving employment disputes. Their argu-
ment would be predicated on fairness, because no one should be denied
the right to a jury. The establishment of a litigation system would func-
tion as an illusory augmentation of employee rights, but the reality would
be the creation of a very unlevel playing field that would advantage em-
ployers with more resources. Employees’ rights advocates would high-
light these facts and note that arbitration’s lower cost thresholds permit
adjudication of claims that could not be brought in litigation. The obvi-
ous result would be that under the proposed litigation system (“the Un-
level Playing Field”), employers would be more able to get away with
violating the law, especially for lower earning employees. It is somewhat
ironic that the momentum to ban mandatory arbitration is as often framed
as an augmentation of employee rights. We hope the model of employ-
ment dispute resolution fairness suggested by this Article serves to slow,
or better still, reverse the momentum against mandatory arbitration. Our
hope is to point academics and lawmakers in a more productive direction
of regulating mandatory arbitration to maximize its transparency and
fairness and provide justice.
234 See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & ZEV J. EIGEN, THE FORUM FOR ADJUDICATION OF EM-
PLOYMENT DISPUTES IN RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOY-
MENT 409, 419–20 (Michael L. Wachter & Cynthia Estlund eds., 2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-2\CJP201.txt unknown Seq: 58  8-MAY-17 9:12
